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ABSTRACT 
Both the President and Congress have Constitutional responsibility for the nation’s 
security. The U.S. Congress, like the President, demonstrates both interest and influence 
over national security affairs. An effective and often overlooked means of determining 
this interest and influence is to examine Congress’s speed of action and the factors that 
influence this speed. The following five variables affect Congress’s speed and provide a 
useful method of analysis: constituent concern, interest groups, committees and 
subcommittees, party leadership and presidential leadership. 
This thesis examines the impact of these variables in two case studies of security 
agency organizational reform. The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004 and the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986—
both represent the fast action of Congress on vital national security problems. Though the 
effects of particular variables differed in the two cases, this study concludes that 
Congress does not need a mystical aligning of all the stars in order to move fast on an 
issue of national security. Instead, the positive impact of one or two variables combined 
with the neutrality of the others results in a fast speed of action from Congress on 
national security affairs. 
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I. INTRODUCTION  
A. PRIMARY PURPOSE 
The influence of the U.S. Congress on national security policy stokes heated 
debate. Questions regarding Congress’s influence range from the original intent for the 
legislative role in foreign affairs to who has the upper hand in what some see as an 
eternal power struggle between the branches of government. This thesis explores one 
specific area of congressional influence: its speed of action. Specifically, what factors 
affect Congress’s speed of action and in what manner? Additionally, what does 
Congress’s speed of action tell us about its influence and interest in national security 
policy? 
B. IMPORTANCE 
Demands for reform in the executive agencies responsible for preserving national 
security are at the forefront of conversation in both academic and policymaking circles. 
The difficult reconstruction of Iraq highlighted serious shortcomings in the interagency 
process. During a National Defense University panel in 2004, Michèle Flournoy, now the 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, outlined a concept of an interagency Goldwater-
Nichols reform for the executive agencies connected to national security.1 This 
terminology is telling considering Goldwater-Nichols was quite literally an act of 
Congress. Internally driven bureaucratic agency reform tends to bring about only modest 
change, and it does not amount to the type of sweeping change being advocated. Change 
of this magnitude inevitably involves the U.S. Congress.  
Providing executive branch policy makers with a better understanding of 
Congress’s influence and interest in national security matters will greatly increase their 
ability to become more effective as the operational guarantor of national security. On the 
other hand, if Congress remains a mysterious box in which no predictions about its  
                                                 
1 Michèle A. Flournoy, “Transforming the National Security Bureaucracy” (panel presentation, 
National Defense University, Washington, D.C., November 17, 2004), http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/ 
joint2004/flournoypaper.htm.  
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interest or involvement in national security can be made, there is a distinct danger that 
policy makers will simply give up the struggle for desperately needed lasting reform in its 
security agencies. 
This thesis demonstrates that although Congress often shows great inertia or acts 
only slowly on security matters, it is also capable of greatly increasing its velocity. The 
legislative branch maintains the closest connection with the public and is best suited to 
judge the intensity of national will and act upon it pragmatically. Congress maintains the 
task of keeping the national will in the forefront while simultaneously balancing security 
imperatives. This study provides not only a better understanding of Congress’s role in 
national security but insight for executive policy makers on the benefits of collaboration 
over conflict with our nation’s legislative branch. 
C. PROBLEMS AND HYPOTHESES  
The primary research question for this thesis is, “What factors affect Congress’s 
speed of action on national security issues and in what manner?” Addressing this 
question simultaneously provides insight into broad classical questions such as, “What 
level of interest does Congress hold in defining national security policy?” “What power 
does Congress have in determining national security policy?” and “What methods does 
Congress use to exert influence over national security policy?” Misunderstandings of 
Congress’s role in national security have led to problems of varying significance from 
minor policy disputes to national scale crises. 
Scholars and politicians have long argued over the role of the United States 
Congress in national security policy. The Constitutional magnitude of this subject 
provides continual energy to the debate. The traditional focus has been determining the 
amount of influence that Congress has in relation to the President, usually measured in 
legislative or administrative action. This thesis focuses instead on Congress’s speed of 
action on national security matters, which in turn demonstrates its influence and interest.  
The traditional “power struggle” model between the legislative and executive is 
fundamentally flawed when applied to national security. The branches do not fight to 
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secure as much power as they can, but rather, they seek to secure the appropriate balance 
of power that gives the highest prospect of achieving their own agendas.  
Congress’s speed of action is the key to explaining its influence, interest and 
overall role in U.S. national security policy. My hypothesis asserts that a combination of 
factors drive Congress to change its speed, exert a desired level of influence over national 
security policy and demonstrate interest to the President. Congress’s influence in terms of 
speed of action cannot be reduced to a simple universal equation such as, “Congress 
demonstrates weakness when it acts slowly and strength when it acts quickly” or vice 
versa. Instead, Congress’s speed of action must be viewed in light of the context of the 
national security issue at hand. For example, if a President is pushing hard for a particular 
security policy and Congress intentionally reduces its speed of action to constrain him, 
this would demonstrate Congress’s own agenda of interest and influence. A counter 
example would be Congress acting quickly on a known national security policy, 
bypassing normal gridlock to demonstrate its influence. Both fast and slow speed of 
action may demonstrate Congress’s influence. Therefore, context is critical to 
understanding Congress’s ability to control its speed thereby demonstrating influence and 
interest.  
This thesis demonstrates how Congress uses this variable speed by examining two 
cases of significant congressional involvement in the national security policy process. It 
will demonstrate why Congress uses this variable speed by determining the impact of five 
variables including constituent impact, interest groups, committees, party leadership and 
presidential leadership. These variables are also examined in light of the domestic and 
international environment. A perceived state of crisis will clearly have a considerable 
impact on all of these variables. James Lindsay argues “How aggressively Congress 
exercises its foreign policy powers turns on the critical question of whether the country 
sees itself as threatened or secure.”2 Although “crisis level” could be considered as a 
sixth variable, a better perspective would be to view it as an overarching environment 
                                                 
2 James M. Lindsay, “From Deference to Activism and Back Again: Congress and the Politics of 
American Foreign Policy,” in The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy: Insights and Evidence, 
ed. Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2004), 
184.  
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that may affect these variables. For example, a crisis may spark latent leadership in a 
president or party, or may motivate constituents to place additional pressure on their 
representatives and, therefore, indirectly affect the speed of action. Likewise, a perceived 
diminishing crisis level may have the opposite effect. 
D. METHODS AND SOURCES 
In order to sufficiently establish the background for the study, the next chapter 
presents a literature review of the general theories of Congress’s role in the national 
security policy arena. The literature review also validates the usefulness of the five 
selected variables: constituent impact, interest groups, committees and sub-committees, 
party leadership and presidential leadership. After laying this foundation, the following 
chapters will examine two significant case studies, including a historical frame of 
reference for each, in order to demonstrate how the five variables affected Congress’s 
speed. Specifically, this paper analyzes the 2004 intelligence reform and the 1986 
Goldwater-Nichols defense reform. The historical frame of reference for each case will 
include the primary motivating factors building up to each of these events.    
These case studies were selected for several reasons. First, these cases have 
endured a significant amount of scrutiny and are likely to be accepted as cases of actual 
congressional action. Second, the wide body of information available for these cases will 
support a deeper look at the effects on each of the aforementioned variables on 
Congress’s speed of action. Third, they both represent distinctive increases in 
congressional speed with slightly different outcomes and relatively different speeds of 
action. Congress implemented the 2004 Intelligence Reform three years after 2001’s 
organizational failures to detect the 9/11 plot, and Goldwater-Nichols took just under five 
years to complete after departing members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff first called for 
reform. Fourth, these cases represent different political environments, with the 2004 
intelligence reform also reflecting a nationally perceived security crisis environment. 
Finally, these case studies contain a common aspect in that both represent congressional 
influence over a specific area of national security policy: security agency organization. 
 5
Difficulty in measurement will undoubtedly be an area of concern; therefore, this 
thesis refrains from attempting to weigh minor differences in the influence levels of the 
variables. Instead, each factor is evaluated for a general positive, neutral or negative 
trend, which contributed to a shift in speed of action. Measuring the overall speed of 
action creates an additional challenge. Specific triggers or starting points for each reform 
have been selected in as objective manner as possible. These triggers represent a best 
choice out of several possible start markers, rather than an only choice. Consequently, 
this may open an opportunity for future debate on this study’s conclusions. More 
importantly, the selected case studies capably illustrate general trends, even if skepticism 
arises over measurement assumptions in the variables.  
E. THESIS OVERVIEW 
The chosen method of organization was selected in order to move from the 
general to the specific and back again. Chapter II establishes the historical and theoretical 
context of the larger debate on the overall influence and interest of the U.S. Congress on 
national security matters. Chapter III analyzes the impact of constituent impact, interest 
groups, committees, party leadership and presidential leadership on Congress’s post 9/11 
reform of the intelligence community. Chapter IV examines these variables impact on the 
Goldwater-Nichols defense reform of the 1980s. Chapter V compares the findings of the 
two cases, considers how this method of analysis could be applied to other sectors of the 
national security arena, and provides a brief recommendation for executive policy makers 
to increase their opportunities for success in national security goals by educated 
collaboration with the legislative branch. 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Examining the role of the Congress is imperative for understanding U.S. security 
policy. A review of relevant literature indicates that any viable study of the foreign and 
security powers of Congress must be viewed in light of the executive branch. For the 
purpose of this thesis, national security policy includes the full spectrum of foreign and 
defense policy in both peacetime and war. Whether an ongoing Constitutional struggle 
for security policy power between the legislative and executive is real or perceived, it is 
clear that the Constitution intends a role for both branches. Three main groups emerge to 
explain these roles; they categorize Congress’s influence on national security as weak, 
strong, or flexible. These categories often carry a prescriptive conclusion explaining how 
strong the influence of Congress should be as well. A major gap in these studies, 
however, is how Congress’s speed of action reflects its influence and interest.  
Before exploring the conventional wisdom regarding Congress’s influence, the 
root of the literature gap must be considered. This thesis argues that the Congress’s speed 
of action is an important factor in explaining congressional influence. Past studies have 
tended to overlook this factor however. Instead, prior research generally considers only 
the specific actions of Congress, often using actual legislation as the primary 
measurement of influence. James Lindsay acknowledges three main types of legislation: 
substantive, procedural, and constraining. However, he views these as part of five broader 
categories of influential action, which hold that legislators act as diplomats, consultants, 
lawmakers, negotiators, and framers of opinion.3 The majority of literature can be 
generally adapted to fit into these categories of influence.  
This thesis differs from past studies in that it examines speed of action as the 
primary dependent variable. The independent variables selected for this study, however, 
reflect traditional consensus on four factors: constituent impact, interest groups, 
committees and sub-committees, and party leadership. Authors who emphasize the 
                                                 
3 James M. Lindsay, “Congress and Diplomacy,” in Congress Resurgent: Foreign and Defense Policy 
on Capitol Hill, ed. Randall B. Ripley and James M. Lindsay (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 
1993), 261–281. 
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strength of these influences typically view Congress as influential and fall under the 
“strong Congress” group. Authors in the “weak Congress” category concede the 
legitimacy of these variables but argue that these variables lack much impact. A third 
“flexible Congress” group argues that these independent variables are quite inconstant 
and congressional influence reflects this fact.   
According to Eileen Burgin, “Despite differences among the individual members 
and the pressures affecting them, almost all sense the influence of constituency when 
making decisions.”4 Burgin’s essay validates constituent influence specifically in relation 
to national security. Although some topics, such as base relocation or major arms 
purchases, draw more constituent attention than general foreign policy, there is 
agreement that overall constituent influence is an important independent variable.5 
Interest groups affect Congress much like constituencies. They are less active on national 
security issues than domestic issues but still a key factor.6 Committees and party 
leadership are also woven throughout the literature as independent variables. The “strong 
Congress” advocates see these as increasingly expansive factors.7 In the post-Cold War 
period, “Congress, and particularly the foreign policy committees, are in an advantageous 
position to play a major role in shaping foreign policy in the decade ahead.”8  
A fifth independent variable is presidential leadership, which has an inverse 
relationship with congressional influence, unlike the previous four. Nearly all sources 
agree that strong presidential leadership in security policy has a weakening effect on 
                                                 
4 Eileen Burgin, “The Influence of Constituents: Congressional Decision Making on Issues of Foreign 
and Defense Policy.” in Congress Resurgent, 67. 
5 Barry M. Blechman, The Politics of National Security: Congress and U.S. Defense Policy (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1990); Robert A. Dahl, Congress and Foreign Policy (New York: 
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1950). 
6 John T. Tierney, “Interest Group Involvement in Congressional Foreign and Defense Policy,” in 
Congress Resurgent. 
7 Richard E. Cohen and Ralph D. Nurnberger. “Congressional Leadership: Seeking a New Role,” In 
The Growing Power of Congress, ed. David M. Abshire and Ralph D. Nurnberger (Beverly Hills: SAGE 
Publications, Inc., 1981); James M. McCormick, “Decision Making in the Foreign Affairs and Foreign 
Relations Committees,” in Congress Resurgent; Christopher J. Deering, “Decision Making in the Armed 
Services Committees,” in Congress Resurgent; White, “Decision Making in the Appropriations 
Subcommittees,” in Congress Resurgent; Barbara Sinclair, “Congressional Party Leaders in the Foreign 
and Defense Policy Arena,” in Congress Resurgent. 
8 McCormick, “Decision Making,” 150. 
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Congress’s influence. Likewise, the literature always views Congress’s power over 
national security policy in relation to the president. This variable draws the greatest 
amount of attention throughout the literature. Although there is general consensus on 
these five variables, the literature is deeply divided over their impact, and can be broken 
into three main groups that view Congress’s influence on security policy as flexible, 
strong, or weak. 
One body of literature contends Congress’s influence is quite flexible.  There is 
agreement among nearly all scholars that the U.S. Constitution intends foreign and 
defense policy influence for both branches. Contextual arguments, such as given by John 
Yoo, infer that understanding the exact intent of Constitutional terms, such as “declare 
war” and “Commander in Chief,” is crucial. Yoo’s argument supports the “flexible 
approach” as meeting the Framers’ intent.9 Others who support this model focus on an 
executive tradition of strength in foreign and defense policy, often revolving around 
decisiveness. They refuse to accept that simply because the executive has obvious 
influence, Congress has no influence. Instead they argue that this balance of power is 
generally neutral with small shifts back and forth.10  
The “flexible Congress” view receives the least attention in the literature. More 
widespread is the belief that Congress is significantly weak or strong relative to the 
executive. These groups share two subcategories: a descriptive view of actual strength 
and a normative view on whether Congress should be weaker or stronger. For the 
purposes of this review, only conclusions on actual strength are discussed. Admittedly, 
authors’ normative biases for a desired state of Congress may affect their conclusions on 
the actual state of influence.     
A second group contends that Congress has strong or notably strengthening 
influence over national security policy. The primary basis for the strong Congress 
                                                 
9  John C. Yoo, “War and the Constitutional Text,” The University of Chicago Law Review 69, no. 4 
(2002). 
10  “Congressional Control of Presidential War-Making under the War Powers Act: The Status of a 
Legislative Veto after Chadha,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review 132, no. 5 (1984): 1217–1241; 
Robert David Johnson, “Congress and the Cold War,” Journal of Cold War Studies 3, no. 2 (2001): 76–
100; Blechman, “Politics of National Security”; James A. Robinson, Congress and Foreign Policy-Making 
(Homewood: The Dorsey Press, Inc., 1962). 
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argument is its ability to place significant checks on an executive branch in spite of a 
consistent increase of public support for strong presidents. The essays found in volumes 
like Congress Resurgent and The Growing Power of Congress represent this viewpoint.11 
David Abshire provides the paradigm for the strong Congress group stating,  “Although, 
at times, the president appears to play a striking international role, by and large the 
Congress increasingly has come to constrain, limit, and often to dominate foreign affairs 
totally . . .”12 Note that congressional strength for Abshire involves shackling executive 
strength. This theme is common amongst the strong Congress theorists. There is less 
focus on the level of initiative in Congress, which remains widely debated.13  
Even those in the strong Congress group, such as Eileen Burgin, find puzzling 
exceptions to a supposedly influential Congress. Burgin analyzes the complete lack of 
response from Congress to the invasion of Panama but determines it an anomaly, 
followed by a stronger reaction during the first Gulf War.14 The majority of the literature 
after the War Powers Resolution of 1973 places this resolution as a central reference 
point. The strong Congress group views it as a shining example of resurgent influence in 
security policy. However, the general lack of compliance and enforcement by all three 
branches of government is heralded by the weak Congress group as evidence for their 
perspective, a point even some strong Congress proponents like Enid Sterling-Conner 
acknowledge.15  
                                                 
11  Ripley and Lindsay, Congress Resurgent; Abshire and Nurnberger, Growing Power of Congress. 
12  David M. Abshire, “Foreign Policy Makers: President vs. Congress.” in Growing Power of 
Congress, 26. 
13 Thomas E. Cronin, “A Resurgent Congress and the Imperial Presidency,” Political Science 
Quarterly 95, no. 2 (1980): 209–237; Lance T. LeLoup, “The Fiscal Straitjacket: Budgetary Constraints on 
Congressional Foreign and Defense Policy-Making,” in Congress Resurgent; Lindsay and Ripley, “How 
Congress Influences,” in Congress Resurgent; Joshua Muravchik, “The Senate and National Security: A 
New Mood,” in Growing Power of Congress; Sharyn O’Halloran, “Congress and Foreign Trade Policy,” in 
Congress Resurgent; Ripley and Lindsay, “Foreign and Defense Policy in Congress: An Overview and 
Preview,” in Congress Resurgent; Paul N. Stockton, “Congress and Defense Policy-Making for the Post-
Cold War Era,” in Congress Resurgent. 
14 Eileen Burgin, “Congress, the War Powers Resolution, & the Invasion of Panama,” Polity 25, no. 2 
(1992): 217–242. 
15 Sterling-Conner, Enid. “The War Powers Resolution: Does It Make a Difference,” in Growing 
Power of Congress. 
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The final group revolves around those who believe congressional influence in 
national security policy has been traditionally weak and shows no signs of changing.  
Politicians themselves often find themselves in this group. Some, like Senator Byrd (D-
WV), decry the continual oppression of Congress in this area.16 Others, like Gerald Ford 
who argues as a prior legislator and chief executive, find that the limitations of Congress 
will always prevent it from achieving primacy in security policy.17 Although Congress’s 
weakness is usually associated with a general lack of influence in policy and war-making 
debates, Amy Zegart points out that Congress has proved equally apathetic towards 
security structure and basic institutions such as the National Security Council (NSC), 
Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).18 The War Powers 
Resolution is a focal point for most of the literature because it demonstrates that even 
when Congress attempts to shift foreign and defense influence away from the President it 
is largely ignored.19 Not surprisingly, even post-9/11 writers come to the same 
conclusions asserting a continued trend of Congress handing over larger amounts of 
security policy influence to the President.20  
Expectedly, the literature generally follows historical events centered around 
specific pieces of security or foreign policy legislation. Prior to the War Powers Act the 
weak Congress literature was more abundant, and similarly afterwards, the strong 
Congress literature dominated for a while. More recently in the wake of the Iraq war a 
resurgence of weak Congress theories abound. However, even during times of dominant 
literature supporting one side, the dissenting view is always present, and this era is no 
                                                 
16 Byrd, Robert C. “Preserving Constitutional War Powers,” Mediterranean Quarterly 14, no. 3 
(2003): 1–5. 
17 Gerald R. Ford, “The War Powers Resolution: Striking a Balance between the Executive and 
Legislative Branches,” in Growing Power of Congress. 
18 Amy B. Zegart, Flawed by Design: The Evolution of the CIA, JCS, and NSC (Stanford: Stanford 
University Press, 1999). 
19 John Hart Ely, “Suppose Congress Wanted a War Powers Act That Worked,” Columbia Law 
Review 88, no. 7 (1988): 1379-1431; Barbara Hinckley, Less Than Meets the Eye: Foreign Policy Making 
and the Myth of the Assertive Congress, (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1994); William C. 
Olson, “The U.S. Congress: An Independent Force in World Politics?,” International Affairs 67, no. 3 
(1991): 547–563. 
20 Louis Fisher, “Deciding on War against Iraq,” Perspectives on Political Science 32, no. 3 (2003): 
135-140; Karl K. Schonberg, “Global Security and Legal Restraint: Reconsidering War Powers after 
September 11,” Political Science Quarterly 119, no. 1 (2004): 115–142. 
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exception. Recently in Foreign Affairs, Norman Ornstein and Thomas Mann discussed 
what happens “When Congress Checks Out,” which was later followed up by William 
Howell and Jon Pevehouse’s response determining how “Congress Checks In.”21 Both 
articles look for evidence of congressional influence (or lack thereof) over Iraq and 
domestic security policy, but they fail to recognize the importance of speed of action as a 
measurement of influence. Although this literature review focused on the last half 
century, the trend of this metronomic form of debate, as previously discussed, goes back 
to the Founders.   
In closing, although there is enormous value in the studies of all three groups, 
they are missing a fundamental aspect of congressional influence in security policy, 
speed of action. Paul Stockton briefly touches on this idea in his conclusion asserting, 
“The president usually is thought to be in a better position than Congress to formulate 
policy initiatives. However, when dramatic change occurs in the circumstances 
underpinning U.S. policy, as in the collapse of the Cold War, Congress has organizational 
advantages in offering a quick response.”22 A deeper look into two examples of a “quick 
response” from Congress’s speed of action will open a more informed debate on 
Congress’s influence on the nation’s security.  
                                                 
21 Norman J. Ornstein and Thomas E. Mann, “When Congress Checks Out,” Foreign Affairs 85, no. 6 
(2006): 67-82; William G. Howell and Jon C. Pevehouse, “When Congress Stops Wars: Partisan Politics 
and Presidential Power.” Foreign Affairs 86, no. 5 (2007): 95–107. 
22 Stockton, “Congress and Defense Policy Making,” 257. 
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III. THE 2004 INTELLIGENCE REFORM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
In 2004, Congress passed the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act 
(IRTPA). Largely hailed as the most significant reform of the intelligence community 
since the National Security Act of 1947, which created the CIA, this legislation serves as 
an excellent case study for the broader question of Congress’s influence and interest in 
national security policy.23 This case contains two important features relevant to the study 
of the Congress’s speed of action. First, the 2004 reform took place in the midst of a 
perceived security crisis in the wake of the 9/11 attacks. Crisis environments tend to 
attenuate the factors that normally determine congressional speed, and also provide a 
clearer opportunity for Congress to express its influence and interest through its speed 
due to increased public awareness.  
Second, neither major fiscal concerns nor immediate threat of war primarily drove 
the debate. Instead, organizational problems became the diagnosis for the perceived 
major failure of the intelligence community. Additionally, unlike force authorization 
bills, which are much more susceptible to time constraints requiring rapid action to be of 
any consequence, intelligence reform did not have the same clear cut time prescription. 
Overall the 2004 intelligence reform effectively serves as an example of congressional 
influence over a national security crisis issue apart from the more traditional areas such as 
authorization of military intervention. 
The first section of this chapter focuses on the historical background of 
congressional involvement in the intelligence community and establishes past precedent 
for congressional influence and interest in this particular aspect of national security. This 
analysis frames the debate in terms of how to view Congress’s speed of action on the 
2004 intelligence reform. If, as some would say, the 2004 reform represents a fifty year 
struggle to implement desired changes into the intelligence community, then Congress 
                                                 
23 Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber, “Introduction to Transforming U.S. Intelligence,” in 
Transforming U.S. Intelligence, ed. Jennifer E. Sims and Burton Gerber (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown 
University Press, 2005), ix. 
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acted extremely slowly. However, as this chapter will demonstrate, if instead this 
legislation represents specific reforms implemented as a response to the 9/11 attacks and 
subsequent 9/11 Commission findings, then they acted quite fast, and even more so if the 
Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD) intelligence failures primarily triggered this 
action. Specifically, only a little more than three years elapsed between the primary 
triggering event and the successful passage of reform legislation. 
The second section analyzes how constituent concern, interest groups, 
committees, party leadership and presidential leadership affected congressional speed. 
This chapter proposes that, in a distinct post-9/11 crisis environment, the combined 
influence of these five variables enabled Congress to demonstrate its interest and 
influence over the intelligence aspect of national security through a “fast” speed of action 
in enacting the 2004 intelligence reform.  
The modern system of intelligence is barely over sixty years old. After initial non-
involvement, Congress has made steady changes over the last three decades with speedy 
course corrections when reacting to intelligence crises. Intelligence reforms including the 
2004 IRTPA show that, as it has done with other instruments of national power, Congress 
has increasingly found new ways to assert itself in the security arena. As Mark Lowenthal 
argues, “Congress has become a consistent player in shaping intelligence policy. This 
seems novel in the case of intelligence only because it is relatively recent.”24 
B. INTELLIGENCE REFORM: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
On December 17, 2004, President George W. Bush signed into law the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act of 2004, which has been widely 
recognized as the largest reform of American intelligence since the National Security Act 
of 1947. Senator Susan Collins (R-ME) first introduced the bill less than three months 
earlier on September 23, 2004, which in addition to certain anti-terrorism measures, 
contained major changes in the organization of the intelligence community. Particularly 
important changes included the establishment of a Director of National Intelligence 
                                                 
24 Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 
2009), 227. 
 15
(DNI) with unprecedented authority as the official head of the sixteen individual 
organizations that comprise the intelligence community. The Act also established 
authority for a National Intelligence Center and a Joint Intelligence Community Council, 
and increased emphasis on education and information sharing.25 This section will review 
the historical relationship between Congress and intelligence prior to the 2004 reform and 
demonstrate past precedent for congressional speed of action on intelligence matters. 
As acknowledged from the beginning of this thesis, Congress is a complex body 
and this thesis does not suggest that it always moves as one uniform actor.  In fact, the 
complexity and difficulty of 535 politicians coordinating the political will of the nation is 
what makes Congress fascinating. Congress has played different roles and accomplished 
a variety of functions throughout the history of U.S. intelligence. The “actions” explored 
here may be the work of the entire Congress passing legislation, committees conducting 
hearings or even the work of individual members of Congress. All of these are important 
to understanding the historical context of the relationship between Congress and 
intelligence, both in the underlying development of intelligence reform concepts and in 
the crisis events that led to action. 
As an initial frame of reference, consider the following statement from Senator 
Pat Roberts (R-KS), then Chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
(SSCI), given during reform hearings in 2004: 
In the wake of this committee’s report on prewar intelligence and the 
upcoming release of the 9/11 Commission’s report, intelligence reform 
should be, and once again is, center stage.   
I say “once again” because we have been down this road a number of 
times. Congress has, on a number of occasions, either of its own volition 
or in response to a specific event, attempted to reform the intelligence 
community. We have created new positions. We have made existing 
positions subject to Senate confirmation. We have reallocated resources. 
We have attempted to terminate and, at times, we have terminated 
programs and directed specific actions be taken. 
                                                 
25 THOMAS (The Library of Congress), “S.2845,” http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d108:SN02845. 
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We have not, however, undertaken a major reexamination of the 
intelligence community’s mission and structure. That effort starts today.26 
Roberts’s perspective recognizes that intelligence reform efforts have often resulted from 
crisis events or “triggers” that reoriented Congress’s attention on the intelligence aspect 
of national security.  Congress’s various reactions to the crises, when viewed 
chronologically, may put forth the appearance of a long term struggle to implement a 
highly desirable and sweeping version of intelligence reform. However, a closer look 
reveals a more situational-based approach of precise reform intended to remedy specific 
failures of the past. 
1. Perceptions of Intelligence and Oversight Failures Prior to 1974 
Intelligence and covert operations in one form or another trace back to the 
nation’s founding. Yet, unlike other early Constitutional dilemmas involving foreign 
policy and war-making powers of Congress and the President, intelligence initially served 
an executive security purpose that the President could levy without significant 
obstruction from Congress. Stephen Knott’s history of covert intelligence operations 
since the time of the Founders supports the notion that for nearly 200 years, due to their 
secret nature, Congress willingly deferred to the executive without viewing this as a 
constraint on their foreign policy powers.27 Gregory Treverton cites the Continental 
Congress’s appropriate dismissal of Thomas Paine for revealing secrets in 1775 followed 
by a “century and a half” in which “the congressional role lapsed.”28 This relatively 
                                                 
26 Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Community Reform: Hearing Before the 
Select Committee on Intelligence, 108th Cong., 2d sess., 2006, 1. 
27 Stephen F. Knott, Secret and Sanctioned: Covert Operations and the American Presidency (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 1–10. 
28 Gregory F. Treverton, “Intelligence: Welcome to the American Government,” in Intelligence and 
National Security: The Secret World of Spies, ed. Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2008), 347. 
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straightforward relationship continued until 1947 when the memory of Pearl Harbor 
became a catalyst for new intelligence demands.29   
Pearl Harbor stands as the first perceived major intelligence failure in the nation. 
Although arguably other surprise attacks on the continent had taken place, a lack of 
intelligence had not received the brunt of responsibility. The creation of the Central 
Intelligence Agency and design of the future intelligence community in the National 
Security Act of 1947 represent the first time the national leadership including Congress 
placed intelligence as a primary national security asset. As such, it required more specific 
funding, organization, and management than it had received when it was treated primarily 
as a wartime function.  
Following the National Security Act of 1947, congressional involvement in the 
intelligence arena can be categorized broadly as either oversight reform or organizational 
reform. For the purpose of this case study, “oversight” refers to active monitoring of 
intelligence related activities, especially covert collection and operations, and ensuring 
compliance with the rule of law. This category includes Congress gaining insight into 
intelligence activities and findings through methods such as congressional hearings, 
commissions, and reports and briefings provided by the intelligence community. I also 
include in this category the oversight structure of Congress, including the organization of 
the Senate and House intelligence committees. Arguably the function of ensuring 
organizational effectiveness and structural integrity within the intelligence community is 
also a form of oversight; however, in order to better categorize congressional action, I  
 
 
                                                 
29 Frank J. Smist, Jr., Congress Oversees the United States Intelligence Community, 4th ed. 
(Knoxville, The University of Tennessee Press, 1994), 1-2.; Phyllis Provost McNeil, “Evolution of the U.S. 
Intelligence Community—An Historical Overview,” in Intelligence and National Security: The Secret 
World of Spies, ed. Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 5-9; 
David M. Barrett, The CIA and Congress: The Untold Story from Truman to Kennedy (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 2005), 9-24. Loch K. Johnson, “Congressional Supervision,” in Intelligence 
and National Security: The Secret World of Spies, ed. Loch K. Johnson and James J. Wirtz (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 392; William E. Odom, Fixing Intelligence: For a More Secure America, 
2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2004), xv. 
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have placed this in the separate category of “organizational effectiveness.”30 Although 
Congress at times placed greater emphasis on one category over another, they are not 
mutually exclusive.  
During the period immediately following the National Security Act of 1947, 
Congress had limited involvement in either category. However, the newly organized 
community was not completely independent of Congress. The CIA as a “central” source 
of intelligence began to serve as the scapegoat for intelligence failure, especially on the 
strategic level.  Administrations beginning with Eisenhower began to demand 
unprecedented levels of predictive intelligence especially with regards to Soviet 
intentions and capabilities.  Accurate tracking of bomber and missile “gaps” became a 
primary tasking of the CIA with ample room for congressional criticism.31  The CIA’s 
failure to predict the 1957 Sputnik launch caused even greater reflection.  As the small 
satellite sailed across the sky evoking American fears, “Some on Capitol Hill wondered 
yet again how well the CIA had been doing its job of forecasting significant events.”32 In 
spite of some concerns Congress did not make any serious attempts at organizational 
reform, allowing for a type of trial period of the new national security structure overall.  
Oversight reform efforts were also limited in scope. Loch Johnson refers to the 
period between the National Security Act and the 1975 Church Committee as the “era of 
trust.”33 The 1947 act extended a great amount of trust to the President and had not 
included widespread congressional oversight of the CIA. He notes that although there 
were a few minor attempts during this period to formalize intelligence oversight, 
Congress generally did not consider it a priority.34  
The most significant of these efforts came from a freshman senator, Mike 
Mansfield (D-MT), who during the 1950s drafted early attempts to create a joint 
                                                 
30 Some authors use the term “oversight” to include all congressional functions, not merely the context 
that are presented in this thesis. 
31 Barrett, CIA and Congress, 236–250. 
32 Ibid., 262. 
33 Loch K. Johnson, “Legislative Reform of Intelligence Policy,” Polity 17, no. 3 (1985): 550–551. 
34 Ibid. 
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committee on intelligence. Although his ideas garnered considerable support, they failed 
to gain traction, partly due to opposition by senior legislators, like Armed Services 
Committee Chairman Richard Russell (D-GA), and partly as a result of the distraction of 
Senator Joseph McCarthy’s (R-WI) grandstanding.35  Although his 1956 resolution did 
not pass, “The debate did, however, result in the creation of formal CIA subcommittees 
in both Armed Services committees.”36 Mansfield’s campaign stands as an anomaly in 
this era, and although it indicates that oversight reform was not completely beyond the 
imagination of Congress, it does not demonstrate the beginning of a widespread 
congressional bid for intelligence oversight powers. As Stephen Knott points out, Senator 
Mansfield “recognized the importance of intelligence matters in formulating American 
foreign policy and wanted a piece of the action.”37  
One alternative hypothesis for the lack of major oversight reform prior to 1974 
suggests that a relatively informed Congress did not consider reform to be necessary 
because it was already effectively monitoring intelligence in ways unseen by the public 
eye. David Barrett proposes that the exact amount of oversight achieved during this 
period is difficult to determine due to the adamant emphasis on secrecy of congressional 
hearings.  Documentation that might validate a more active oversight effort from 
Congress has likely been destroyed or lost.38 Barrett acknowledges that “Legislative 
oversight of the CIA was not comprehensive,” but he also notes that “Congressional 
oversight was not simply passive or static across the CIA’s first fifteen years.”39 Knott’s 
research leads him to a similar conclusion regarding the 1947-1974 period:  
Thus the popular view that Congress was kept in the dark by the agency 
and was unaware of its actions simply does not hold up under inspection… 
the system of checks and balances was not disregarded, but rather an 
accommodation was reached between Congress and the executive that 
allowed for the dissemination of information from the CIA to senior  
 
                                                 
35 Barrett, CIA and Congress, 171–196, 223–233. 
36 Treverton, “Intelligence: Welcome to the American Government,” 348. 
37 Knott, Secret and Sanctioned, 16–163. 
38 Barrett, CIA and Congress, 3–5. 
39 Ibid., 458–459.  
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members. The level of congressional oversight of Cold War-era 
clandestine operations far exceeded the level of any earlier period in the 
nation’s history.40 
Knott claims that consistent bipartisan support for executive Cold War foreign policy 
during these years has been mistakenly classified as congressional apathy towards 
oversight.41 
Barrett and Knott argue against the more widespread belief that Congress, during 
the era of trust, unwittingly produced an uncontrolled expansion of the CIA’s covert 
intelligence gathering and operations. In contrast, Frank Smist argues for this hypothesis, 
stating, “the failure of Congress to do no more than advocacy oversight led the CIA and 
the other intelligence agencies to engage in activities that would be both carefully and 
publically examined in the years ahead by congressional committees with a very different 
oversight mindset.”42 However, this hypothesis may be a case of correlation lacking 
evidence of causality. After all, in the first 130 years of executive intelligence functions 
these types of activities were not widely pursued, in spite of near complete autonomy 
from Congress. Whether lack of oversight in the 1950s and 1960s caused a reckless CIA 
to carryout ridiculous assassination plots and spy on Americans remains to be seen. We 
can, however, acknowledge the limited level of overt and public oversight during these 
early years. Snider maintains a harsher criticism, “it was not until the mid-1970s that 
Congress decided that it had better get serious about intelligence oversight.”43 
The baseline for general intelligence reform begins in 1947, yet even this 
expansion of intelligence does not indicate that Congress initially perceived the need to 
elevate intelligence to an “executive versus legislative” foreign policy question of 
Constitutional authority or a function worth micromanaging with painstaking oversight.44  
 
                                                 
40 Knott, Secret and Sanctioned, 163. 
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In fact, the next major perceived failure, which came in the mid-seventies, had much less 
to do with a Constitutional foreign policy battle than with a traditional legislative check 
on executive inroads on civil liberties. 
2. Congress’s New Look at Intelligence: 1974–2001 
In 1974, accusations of CIA spying on Americans pushed Congress to pursue a 
new level of intelligence oversight. This trigger event does not demonstrate slow action 
by Congress over almost thirty years, but instead a quick response in a period of already 
great distrust of the executive branch in the aftermath of Vietnam and Watergate. 
Congress had the year before passed the War Powers Resolution, and the mentality that 
led to this challenge to executive prerogative still pervaded the halls of Congress.45 
Skeptics may suggest that Congress’s newfound interest in oversight simply 
demonstrated a previous lack of influence. This assumption, however, overlooks the 
possibility that Congress, prior to the mid-seventies, did not see meticulous and public 
intelligence oversight as a requirement to achieve national security policy goals. Instead, 
Congress may have actually seen the protection of the intelligence community’s 
autonomy as their more pressing duty.46  
The Church Committee in the Senate and to a lesser degree the Pike Committee in 
the House served as the changing point into a new era of greater skepticism, greater 
interest, and greater oversight.47 During what Loch Johnson refers to as the “era of 
uneasy partnership” Congress produced the 1974 Hughes-Ryan Act and the Intelligence 
Oversight Act of 1980, which included notably higher levels of reporting requirements 
from the CIA.48 Congress focused its oversight efforts on covert action that would 
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continue to dominate the debate through the Iran-Contra scandal.49  Loch Johnson 
concludes, “the intelligence investigation of 1975 succeeded. Though flawed, the inquiry 
satisfied the primary standard by which a legislature must be judged in a democracy: it 
enhanced freedom and well being of the citizens.”50 The failure often attributed Congress 
in its oversight role is that it did not create enough specific legislation to constrain the 
intelligence community, yet this type of legislation is not the only tool at Congress’s 
disposal. 
An alternative explanation for the oversight reform during this era comes from the 
school of new institutionalism that questions the conventional wisdom that Congress 
must constantly legislate to demonstrate interest and influence. James Lindsay 
summarizes this theory of procedural influence stating, “In short, delegation is not 
necessarily abdication because members of Congress may have used procedural 
innovations to structure the decision making process in the executive branch in ways that 
make it likely that their preferred policies are chosen.”51 Lindsay uses the case study of 
intelligence oversight through covert reporting requirements as outlined by the 
aforementioned Hughes-Ryan Amendment of 1974 and the Intelligence Oversight Act of 
1980.52 By enacting oversight procedures in the past, Congress solidified permanent 
interest in the intelligence aspect of national security and showed significant progress 
toward “its avowed goals of preventing rogue operations and making the intelligence 
community more attentive to the views of Congress.”53 Congressional dominance theory 
echoes these same themes, arguing that control mechanisms can be built into legislation 
by Congress to act as permanent oversight aids.54 
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Lindsay cites the Iran-Contra scandal as another interesting oversight dilemma.  
Although the committees’ inability to uncover the affair demonstrated a major failure on 
the one hand,55 the executive branch’s resort to nontraditional means of executing the 
covert operation reveals a larger success of the oversight structure on the other hand. “If 
the intelligence committees had been ineffectual in their oversight efforts, [Director of 
Central Intelligence (DCI)] Casey would not have felt compelled to bypass normal CIA 
channels.”56 Robert Gates, in his 1987 defense of the CIA, made a similar claim stating, 
“Another safeguard of objectivity where covert action is involved is the recognition 
inside the CIA that intelligence work in these areas is bound to be scrutinized for signs of 
bias with special care by readers in the executive branch and especially in Congress.”57 
More scholars have begun to question the idea that Congress failed to win the 
information battle with the executive branch after the reforms of the 1970s.  Gregory 
Treverton recently went so far as to suggest that “Congress now receives virtually the 
same intelligence analysis as the executive.”58 In fact, Robert Gates as the Deputy DCI 
made this same claim ten years earlier demonstrating the significant procedural oversight 
embedded in Congress’s intelligence committees.59  According to Gates, the effective 
status of congressional oversight heading into the 1990s was that  
the CIA is in no position to withhold much information from Congress and 
is extremely sensitive to congressional demands; the Congress has 
enormous influence and information yet remains suspicious and 
mistrustful.  Such a central legislative role with respect to an intelligence 
service is unique in American history and in the world.60  
The exact accuracy of this statement is much less important than the fact that the Deputy 
DCI perceived Congress’s oversight as real and extensive. Following the oversight 
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concerns and actions of the seventies and eighties, Congress began to shift its emphasis 
towards organizational reform in the nineties. 
In 1992, the House and Senate began working on intelligence reorganization in 
the wake of Desert Storm and the end of the Cold War, with a primary goal of improving 
quality of intelligence through reorganization of the intelligence community. This 
included the first real congressional proposal to create a Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) autonomous from the CIA for more than traditional oversight reasons. Earlier 
legislation had been attempted in 1978 that would have created a “Director of National 
Intelligence” as an overseer still leading the CIA (in a more detached role), rather than a 
taskmaster to improve interagency cooperation and enhance effectiveness.61  Ernest May 
analyzed the bill and considered the DNI element of reform to actually be a restoration of 
sorts to the power intended for the DCI in 1947, whereas other elements, such as creating 
a National Intelligence Council, were forward looking changes. The dynamic change in 
the international environment following the demise of the Soviet Union and eastern bloc 
triggered renewed congressional interest in organizational intelligence reform.62  
May’s influential article also made clear that in preparing for these new 
challenges, “Congressionally mandated organizational changes could make this 
[executive driven improvements] harder not easier.  The intelligence oversight 
committees can give most help by prodding the executive to prepare for the future instead 
of just conserving what was built up from the past.”63 Although the 1992 legislation 
calling for massive reform was not enacted, Frank Smist credits Senate Select 
Intelligence Committee Chairman, David Boren (D-OK), with using the annual 
authorization bills to effectively implement the ideas that arose from the Church and Iran-
Contra committees.64 The proposed 1992 intelligence reform accurately marks the first 
attempt for this level of organizational reform. Zegart explains the reform attempts in the 
1992 and 1996 as indicative of the intelligence committees recognizing the need for 
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intelligence restructuring, but being frustrated by the executive, especially defense 
advocates both in the Pentagon and the armed services committees.65  These attempts 
indicate noteworthy, though not overwhelming evidence that Congress began to assign a 
higher priority to intelligence reorganization during the 1990s.   
The 9/11 terrorist attacks at the beginning of the century created a crisis 
environment in which Congress moved faster and harder than on all of its previous 
reform efforts, culminating in the 2004 Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act. Just one year after the attacks, Congress prepared and conducted an extensive joint 
inquiry, but refrained from implementing any simplistic reactionary legislation. Instead, 
Congress’s fast speed on intelligence reform was marked by having placed a sweeping 
investigation into motion, the 9/11 Commission, and then responding firmly and quickly 
to the Commission’s findings. Although the 2004 reform included some aspects of 
oversight, the failure that drove the legislation stemmed from perceptions of 
organizational ineffectiveness. This reform had much more in common with the initial 
1947 legislation than with oversight reforms of the seventies and eighties. Mark 
Lowenthal asserts that “the essence of congressional oversight is the ability to gain access 
to information usually held by the executive, which is relevant to the functioning of the 
government.”66 However, when discussing the executive view of oversight he 
summarizes an organizational effectiveness strand of oversight stating, “The core 
oversight issue is whether the intelligence community is properly carrying out its 
functions, that is, whether the community is asking the right questions, responding to 
policy makers’ needs, being rigorous in its analysis, and having on the other hand the 
right operational capabilities (collection and covert action).”67 This effectiveness issue is 
what dominated the 2004 intelligence reform, much more so than the simple war over 
information. Whereas the Church Committee arose from concern over what the CIA was 
doing, the post-9/11 emphasis was on what the intelligence community was not doing, or 
at least not doing effectively. 
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One of the primary ideas associated with long term intelligence reform is 
leadership and authority in the intelligence community.  Lowenthal points out that the 
“designation DCI predates the creation of the CIA,” demonstrating the necessity of 
intelligence coordination.68  The 2004 implementation of a DNI was not an original 
concept, but neither should it be seen as the climax of a nearly sixty year battle.  At most, 
it was a steady twenty-five year shaping of the position. A more accurate description 
requires understanding that as technology and the sheer size of the government expanded 
the intelligence community in many directions, the ability of the DCI to manage the CIA 
and coordinate intelligence became harder and harder, requiring “freeing the DNI from 
running any agency and thus allowing the DNI to concentrate on the larger role.”69  
Lowenthal admits that the subsequent question is whether or not the DNI can fulfill this 
role without “the strong institutional base that the CIA afforded the DCI.”70 What is 
important is that in 1947 the intelligence community was arguably small enough to be 
simultaneously managed by the CIA director, and therefore this issue does not 
necessarily date back to the creation of the DCI, but more logically to a point where the 
size and scope of the intelligence community exceeded DCI coordination capability. The 
crisis environment that sparked the 2004 legislation demonstrated to Congress a proven 
failure of the intelligence leadership system and the bill, therefore, incorporated 
organizational reform including a more powerful, though arguably still limited DNI. 
Information sharing within the community of intelligence agencies became 
another key aspect of the 2004 organizational reform and stands apart as having the least 
in common with previous reform efforts. Congress traditionally identified the “sharing” 
problem as the CIA not providing sufficient information to the intelligence oversight 
committees.71 Indeed, Congress had its own information sharing problems as revealed in 
1984 when the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) was aware 
of U.S. plans to mine harbors in Nicaragua, but the Senate was left completely in the 
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dark.72 Yet, these greatly differ from the types of sharing failures addressed in 2004. Poor 
interagency sharing may have been a long time quandary for critics of the intelligence 
community, but Congress did not necessarily identify this as a problem.  If anything, a 
congressional skepticism of information sharing, especially between the FBI and CIA, 
should come as no great surprise since the previous oversight focus of the 1970s 
concentrated on eliminating the CIA’s expansion of activities into the domestic realm.   
The Congressional Research Service in their 2004 summary of intelligence reform 
proposals concluded that the history of the intelligence community reform has been a 
relatively steady process and, “The general trend has been towards more thorough 
oversight both by the executive branch and by congressional committees.”73 
Congressional speed of action on intelligence is best broken down in three parts.  In long 
term reform, the Congress showed steady progress in maintaining oversight of the 
intelligence community from the seventies until 2004.   In terms of organizational 
effectiveness, the Congress began considering reform in 1992 but did not deem it 
necessary until the 9/11 crisis, at which point it implemented two major changes: 
establishing the DNI and the Information Sharing Environment (ISE)/Information 
Sharing Council (ISC).  Additionally, the 2004 Intelligence Reform Act placed a myriad 
of reporting constraints on the executive branch codifying continued oversight.74  Critics 
will, of course, point to the limited enforcement that Congress has demanded, but as the 
House’s Intelligence Subcommittee on Oversight stated in its 2006 review, “The ultimate 
success or failure of the Intelligence Reform Act is yet to be determined.”75 
C. CONGRESSIONAL SPEED OF ACTION ON INTELLIGENCE REFORM 
Examining the historical relationship between Congress and intelligence reform 
demonstrates the increasing interest that Congress has placed on this aspect of national 
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security. Intelligence, no longer the sole interest of the executive, has assumed a more 
public and prominent role as a vital instrument of national security. This is why 
Treverton considers the modern intelligence community to have “joined the American 
government,” meaning that it is no longer as distinctive from other policy arenas as it 
once was.76 As we look at what has influenced Congress’s speed of action on the 
intelligence issues represented by the 2004 reform, the five conventional variables of 
constituent concern, interest groups, committees/subcommittees, party leadership and 
presidential leadership prove useful.  In order to understand their impact on the 2004 
intelligence reform, these should be applied both to the supposed long term reform efforts 
as well as the crisis reform efforts. Ultimately, these five variables indicate to the 
Congress what rate of speed will effectively demonstrate interest and influence in the 
intelligence aspect of national security. In this particular case, the combined effect of 
these variables, especially constituent concern and interest groups, led to a fast rate of 
congressional speed of action.  
1. Constituent Concern 
First, constituent concern after 9/11 encouraged increased speed of action by 
Congress on intelligence issues. Past theories of the effect of constituents on long-term 
national security efforts proposed that legislators are generally uninterested in pursuing 
that which cannot be rewarded at the polls. Few Congress members have vested political 
interests in intelligence reform on a daily basis. Public perceptions of intelligence failure, 
however, can create a new situation that encourages Congress to speed up its actions.  In 
the 1970s, less than a month after Seymour Hersh published his articles exposing 
domestic intelligence actions in the New York Times, the Senate established the Church 
Committee.77 A decade later, the Iran-Contra scandal achieved a similar level of public 
notoriety that also led to rapid reaction by Congress. The terrifying attacks on 9/11 
solidified public concern about intelligence and thereby constituent relevance at the 
highest level yet.  However, Congress, like the public, was not necessarily quick to judge 
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the intelligence community.  Immediate congressional action at the time involved 
supporting counterterrorism operations first and dealing with the intelligence failure only 
after a thorough examination of the causes.     
The crisis environment provided an especially clear forum for linking Congress 
with constituent interests. Unlike the oversight reform efforts of the seventies, the crisis 
was not caused by the executive, but was provoked by outside sources. Two separate 
trigger events helped create the crisis environment. The 9/11 attacks and the subsequent 
findings of the 9/11 Commission receive the bulk of attention as the primary trigger for 
intelligence reform, but another major intelligence failure played an arguably larger role.  
Mark Lowenthal concluded that, “the issue that provided the ultimate impetus for the 
intelligence legislation of 2004 was not the investigations into the September 11 attacks 
but the issue of Iraq weapons of mass destruction (WMD).”78 The combination of these 
two failures, which became apparent in 2004, put constituent pressure on Congress to 
“fix” the problems in a new way. Effective reorganization by the executive seemed 
unlikely and, much like Goldwater-Nichols, Congress members could effectively gain 
poll rewards by showing support for reorganization.  
Polling data in the months leading up to the 2004 reform contains some 
interesting figures. According to an April 2004 Gallup poll, taken after Condoleezza Rice 
and George Tenet testified to the 9/11 Commission, 63 percent of Americans believed 
either “major reforms” or a “complete overhaul” of the “agencies responsible for 
stopping terrorism, such as the CIA and FBI,” was necessary.79 In July of 2004, 
following the release of the 9/11 Commission’s report, Gallup asked Americans whether 
the 9/11 recommendations “require urgent action and Congress and the president should 
enact them immediately” or if “they are important, but Congress and the president should 
take the time they feel they need to adequately review and enact them.” Over 63 percent 
chose the latter response. One might take this as a sign that Americans did not consider 
the matter urgent, but consider this response in context of the following question taken in 
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the same poll: when asked if people approved or disapproved of the 9/11 Commission’s 
report, over 50 percent answered that they “haven’t heard enough to say.”80 Americans 
inferred that while they were not yet familiar with the details of the report, they placed 
responsibility for implementation of proper reform on the shoulders of Congress and the 
President, creating an opportunity for Congress to take the lead on an issue of increasing 
importance to the public.  
As more Americans became familiar with the report, it became an item for 
campaign consideration. In fact, in the weeks before the election, Gallup asked, “Suppose 
the Democrats win control of both houses of Congress in this year’s elections and try to 
do each of the following after they take control in January. Please say whether you would 
approve or disapprove of that action?” Nearly 62 percent of those polled approved the 
action to “implement all of the anti-terror recommendations made by the 9/11 
commission” indicating that security reform had taken center stage in the 2004 election.81 
Intelligence reform continued to hold public interest in the year to follow.  
In a 2005 Foreign Affairs article, the Public Agenda research organization 
released the findings of their first iteration of the Confidence in U.S. Foreign Policy 
Index (CFPI). The polling took place a little more than six months after the IRTPA was 
signed into law, and revealed public appreciation for the importance of intelligence as 
well as interest in reform efforts. The author, Daniel Yankelovich, concluded, “Some 65 
percent of Americans polled believe that reforming the intelligence services is the best 
way to strengthen U.S. security significantly. Yet, in their eyes the matter seems to lack 
urgency, because they believe that the government has already begun to take remedial 
action.”82 In fact, by the time this survey was released, the WMD Commission’s findings 
had been released as well. These essentially validated the decision to pass the IRTPA as a 
first step and recommended strong implementation and oversight of the reform. Public 
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opinion data, in sum, indicates that a combination of factors, including the 9/11 
Commission’s findings, linked intelligence community failure to the crisis environment.  
Subsequently, intelligence reform began to resonate with constituents, which created a 
clear opening for Congress to lead in the reform effort with the added reward of a 
demonstration of national security influence in an election year.83 Constituent concerns 
strongly motivated Congress to increase speed on such reforms. Beyond the wide 
constituent base, interest groups also had impact on Congress’s speed. 
2. Interest Groups 
Secondly, interest groups affected congressional speed on intelligence reform, 
both in long term and crisis motivated reform. Interest groups of two varieties represent 
the long-term influence on Congress in intelligence matters. The first groups are those 
generally organized against the expansion of intelligence functions or budgets and 
otherwise wary of executive secrecy, such as civil liberties groups.  The other, more 
traditional lobbies represent “firms that derive large amounts of their income from the 
work they do for the intelligence community.”84 Natural constraints have limited the 
effectiveness of these more traditional lobbies.  “Few interest groups exist in this policy 
domain, and those that do (the Boeing Corporation, for instance, which manufactures 
surveillance satellites), are rarely able to discuss whatever grievances they may have in 
public, given the classified nature of their work.”85 
Although long-term interest groups are less prevalent in intelligence issues, they 
still have significant impact.  Consider John Tierney’s theory that states, “organized 
interests are more likely to be able to affect outcomes on issues that are shielded from 
public or media scrutiny and do not conflict with legislators’ deeply felt convictions, lines 
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of party cleavage, or particularistic constituency needs.”86 The intelligence committees 
certainly fall solidly under this umbrella; however this effectiveness should be balanced 
against Tierney’s caveat that interest groups have greater likelihood of helping resist 
policy changes than implementing them.87  This, in part, accounts for the unsatisfied cries 
of scholarly advocates who lament what they see as slow movement to implement the 
“obvious” reforms needed.  Long-term interest groups most likely have a balanced effect 
on speed.  Those seeking to increase profits by building the next level of spy technology 
may push for more immediate action, while those who promote agency interests are 
extremely likely to attempt to stall congressional reform action that may reduce the 
budget or personnel they represent.  
One other organization with significant long-term intelligence interest deserves 
some attention: the Department of Defense. The next chapter will explore in greater depth 
the manner in which the Defense Department acts as an interest group on its own behalf, 
but its influence on the 2004 intelligence reform should not be overlooked either. As a 
large stakeholder in the intelligence budget process, the Defense Department held a 
vested interest in ensuring that reform would not diminish its authority and funding. Amy 
Zegart argues that the Department had been crucial in the defeat of intelligence reform 
attempts in 1992 and 1996 and attempted to block the 2004 legislation as well.88 While 
many of the agencies within the intelligence community exhibited reluctance to avoid 
change, the Defense Department’s enormous size and resources presented a much larger 
obstacle. The extent to which the Department desired to completely halt the post-9/11 
intelligence reform movement remains unclear. Regardless of its intent, while the 
Department did secure significant compromises over budget and personnel issues, it 
could not prevent the intelligence overhaul process altogether. The Department of 
Defense efforts were ultimately overshadowed by pro-reform, crisis-driven interest 
groups.  
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Crisis-driven interest groups, on the other hand, have a greater hand in speeding 
up congressional action. The anti-intelligence interest groups are more effective at 
bringing about quicker action as they tend to represent greater constituent interest in 
protecting civil liberties as was the case in 1975. Although Jewish and Christian interest 
groups had a positive influence on the speed of post 9/11 reforms, the most significant 
interest group impact on the 2004 reform stemmed from average Americans most closely 
connected with the crisis.89  Lowenthal notes, “In the aftermath of 9/11, a faction of 
families who lost relatives in that attack became a powerful lobby in favor of the 
legislation creating a DNI, an issue in which their inputs were understandably more 
emotional than analytical.”90  
M. Kent Bolton’s work on IRTPA considers the impact of the “the families” 
interest group concluding, “The victims’ families became a source of U.S. national 
security policy change, particularly influential in creating the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act.”91  Bolton describes the path of their influence as beginning 
with the 9/11 Commission’s own admission that the family members were “instrumental” 
in its creation. The families’ influence gained momentum when they formed the Family 
Steering Committee. The steering committee closely monitored the 9/11 Commission’s 
work and their influence peaked in the election year of 2004 with their support for the 
Commission’s hearings, findings and recommendations, many of which were realized in 
the IRTPA.92 Ultimately, Bolton characterizes the victims’ families as a special interest 
group that represented a “critical societal input that hastened the Intelligence Reform and 
Terrorism Prevention Act.”93 Amy Zegart’s claim that “These were the first intelligence 
reform interest groups in U.S. history” is debatable, but truly “they were powerful forces  
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for change.”94  In a way, Zegart herself represented these interest groups by strongly 
advocating reform especially with regards to a new independent DNI before the Senate 
during the 2004 reform hearings.95  
3. Committees 
The third variable, the impact of committees on intelligence, has changed 
substantially over the years, leading to the ability to pursue reform faster. Conventional 
wisdom holds that the most influential legislators will be reluctant to pursue intelligence 
committee posts because, due to the committee’s secrecy requirements, they will find 
difficulty getting credit for their work.96 Before the creation of the intelligence 
committees, the more prominent armed services and appropriations committees were able 
to balance unrewarding tasks of intelligence oversight with the more public and 
prestigious functions of their committees. This also forced the executive branch to deal 
with strong congressional leaders. Former DCI, Richard Helms (1966-73), in a 2003 
interview with Loch Johnson, noted that the committee leadership prior to the scandals of 
the seventies were effective in their oversight due to their powerful positions, and denies 
the proposition that Congress was simply “co-opted” in those days.97 
The current committees have come a long way in making the intelligence 
committee seats a desirable and respected position to hold.  Lindsay notes “In 1983, 
nearly thirty members applied for three Democratic openings on the House Intelligence 
Committee.  In 1987, sixty representatives signed up for four openings on the House 
Intelligence Committee.”98 As these positions become more respected not merely inside 
the beltway, but by the public at large, the committees will continue to gain influence 
over intelligence policy, and the small size of each committee makes this fact even more 
poignant.  
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One year after the 9/11 attacks the House and Senate Intelligence Committees 
held a joint inquiry over the course of September and October of 2002. The purpose, as 
stated by the SSCI Chairman, Sen. Robert “Bob” Graham (D-FL), was to “inform the 
American people of our findings and to continue exploring what reforms will be 
necessary to reduce the chances of another terrorist attack on our homeland.”99  He went 
on to outline three key areas of the inquiry. The first two involved the terrorist threat 
itself and the specific intelligence questions of the 9/11 attacks. The third area more 
generally encompassed how the inquiry could lead to recommendations for structural 
changes in the Intelligence Community.100 The 2002 hearings were quickly followed by 
legislative action to establish the 9/11 Commission on November 27, 2002. The SSCI and 
HPSCI then allowed the Commission to complete its task before resuming debate. In 
anticipation of the release of the Commission’s report findings, the SSCI held a one day 
hearing in July 2004, followed by two more days of hearings in August after the report 
was published on July 22, 2004.101 The short and supportive 2004 Senate hearings 
framed the debate for a quick and decisive victory on the floor with legislation passing in 
mere weeks by an overwhelming margin of 96-2.102 In this case the committees enhanced 
the speed of congressional reform to demonstrate interest and influence to the executive. 
In the future, however, the committees may wield their influence to slow down desired 
presidential action if necessary for the same reasons. 
4. Party Leadership 
Fourth, party leadership influenced speed to a degree, but was noticeably lacking 
the same level of influence as constituents and committees.  Party leadership mainly 
influences intelligence speed in that it chooses the appointees to the committees.  
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Lowenthal states, “The Party leadership in both Houses wants to be sure that members 
are selected who will not only take their oversight role seriously and will be careful not to 
disclose classified information but who reflect that Congress is a serious steward when it 
handles intelligence.”103 The generally bipartisan natures of the committees also prevent 
party leadership from being able to assert too much pressure to conform to standards 
without risking the appearance of risking security for party goals.  
It is not suggested that the parties have not had significant divisions over 
intelligence matters. Britt Snider notes the “debilitating” effect of increasing partisanship 
within the committees during the nineties.104 Lowenthal, however, argues that a highly 
partisan House and a bipartisan Senate may actually have an overall positive effect on 
intelligence.105  Proposed solutions for the 2004 reform included organizational remedies 
for the committees such as combining them into a single joint committee, an idea that had 
been pressed upon Congress since the Tower Commission106, but ultimately, “As has 
been the case in the past, congressional organization was not legislated and was left to the 
respective chambers.”107 Aside from the creation of the intelligence committees in the 
seventies, Congress has been skeptical about new types of internal solutions to oversight 
problems.  In the case of 2004, the margin of bipartisan support for the reform seem to 
indicate that although party leaders, conscious of constituent and interest group factors,  
promoted the reform their leadership had less effect on the fast speed of action. More 
importantly, the party leadership on both sides of the aisle refrained from slowing the 
reform momentum.  
5. Presidential Leadership 
Finally, the influence presidential leadership has on Congress’s speed in 
intelligence reform demonstrates that, unlike other subcategories of national security, 
presidential leadership is unpredictable and therefore hard to quantify.  Congress’s efforts 
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to increase oversight generally draw criticism as they are seen as limiting executive 
power and fall under the more traditional conflict over Constitutional national security 
powers.  Organizational reform efforts, however, draw more diverse reactions.   
As previously discussed, reform efforts in the nineties were outwardly hampered 
by the executive. Some argue that the 2004 legislation was watered down excessively due 
to executive bureaucratic loyalties.108 However, even what Helen Fessenden referred to 
as “tepid” support from President Bush ultimately had a positive effect on ensuring the 
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act was passed less than a year from the 
release of the 9/11 Commission’s report. 109 The relationship between Congress and 
President Bush on intelligence reform remains difficult to classify. In William Odom’s 
2004 preface to his book on intelligence reform, which revitalized a study from the 1990s 
in the post 9/11 environment, he claimed that President Bush remained “adamantly 
opposed to intelligence reform.” Odom further compared this to Bush’s initial opposition 
to the development of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), which he later chose 
to “champion.” Odom concluded that “The president seems unlikely, however, to grab 
the banner of intelligence reform and make it his own unless Congress convinces him—
as it did in homeland security—that it will seize the initiative if he does not.”110 As it 
turns out, the events of 2004 validated Odom’s hypothesis and as Congress began to gain 
momentum in the fall and winter, the President began publicly supporting reform.111 One 
final note must be made regarding the President’s influence on Congress’s speed of 
action, which involves the difference between statements (remarks) made at a bill’s 
signing and “signing statements.” The Bush administration habitually issued signing 
statements on controversial bills that could be interpreted as infringing upon executive 
                                                 
108 David S. Cloud, “Bush Presses for Intelligence Bill,” The Wall Street Journal, December 3, 2003. 
109 Helen Fessenden, “The Limits of Intelligence Reform,” Foreign Affairs 84, no. 6 (2005): 109. 
110 Odom, Fixing Intelligence, x. 
111 Spencer Ackerman, “Small Change,” The New Republic, December 13, 2004, 12–13; Cloud, “Bush 
Presses for Intelligence Bill;” Peter Grier and Faye Bowers, “What Spy Reform Means; The Biggest 
Overhaul of U.S. Intelligence Since World War II Formally Centralizes Authority,” The Christian Science 
Monitor, December 8, 2004; Walter Pincus, “Intelligence Bill Clears Congress; Bush Expected to Approve 
Post-9/11 Reforms Next Week,” The Washington Post, December 9, 2004. 
 38
authority to clarify how the law would be executed and the IRTPA was no exception. The 
statement contained the trademark language of the administration: 
The executive branch shall construe the Act, including amendments made 
by the  Act, in a manner consistent with the constitutional authority of the 
President to conduct the Nation's foreign relations, as Commander in 
Chief of the Armed Forces, and to supervise the unitary executive branch, 
which encompass the authority to conduct intelligence operations.112  
The actual remarks made by the President at the time of the signing, however, were 
positive and supportive, indicating that the reform “continues the essential reorganization 
of our Government.”113  A valid critique holds that the President may have been willing 
to publicly support reform only because he intended to interpret it in a manner that would 
retain strong executive authority over the reorganized intelligence community. However, 
this would not explain President Bush’s early resistance to reform, not does it negate the 
overall positive effect of the President’s acquiescence to Congress’s speed of action on 
this issue. Congress effectively demonstrated their influence and interest in national 
security matters to a strong executive who in the end signed the reform into law just three 
months after it was first introduced.  
These five variables represent the influences bearing on Congress’s decisions to 
move quickly or slowly. In intelligence reform, the direct relationship between perceived 
failures and reaction by Congress suggests that these variables have short-term effects 
with long-term impact. Unfortunately, they have also inadvertently contributed to a 
mistaken perception that the 2004 reform was the capstone of a thirty year battle of 
Congress to impose its influence on the intelligence community.  In reality, these five 
variables moved Congress to implement several separate specific changes in policy over 
the course of many years, including the massive overhaul of 2004.  
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D. POSSIBLE CRITIQUES 
Skeptics who might claim that Congress did not move quickly on intelligence 
reform, and consequently had little influence or interest over this matter of national 
security, should consider an important distinction: the failure to implement specific 
intelligence reforms that external proponents may demand does not simply equate to 
failure to exercise their Constitutional powers to influence issues of national security.  
Such critics seem to suggest that a third form of special interest group, consisting of 
“expert” opinions from academia or think tanks, should be the sole factor by which to 
judge Congress’s speed of action.  Consider, for example, Helen Fessenden’s statement: 
But even broad support in the Senate, overwhelming public opinion, and a 
best-selling report were not enough to move congress nearly as far as 
overhaul proponents had hoped. The story thus serves as a textbook case 
of how the opaque ways of Washington’s bureaucratic warfare undermine 
sound policy.114  
She further asserts that “compromise” occurred that may not lead to the “long-term 
transformation” proposed by external reform advocates.115 In essence, Fessenden infers 
that Congress has some duty to implement the full recommendations of outside “experts” 
in rapid time in order to prove that they have the ability to influence national security. 
This is a common but questionable assumption, which considers that just because 
external security recommendations are provided to Congress, that they are the correct and 
prudent action for the U.S. government. Often, long-term efforts of intelligence reform 
proponents in the executive branch, think tanks, and academia become inaccurately tied 
to Congress’s reform efforts. 
As another example, consider Amy Zegart’s statement on committee reform 
action, which was considered in 2004, but not implemented, “It was no secret that this 
fragmented oversight system desperately needed fixing.  Restructuring the Congress was 
recommended in seven of the twelve intelligence and terrorism studies between 1991 and 
2001. Yet Congress never acted.”116 This sounds very compelling until you consider the 
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alternate inference that nearly half of the studies did not recommend restructuring. A 
“glass half empty” way of looking at it may consider that what these studies actually 
demonstrated to Congress was that the effectiveness of this type of reform was highly 
debatable so that they therefore chose to maintain the status quo.  
Another possible critique might consider all of these variables as secondary to the 
factor of a hotly contested election year closely connected to the dual crises of the 9/11 
attacks and the war in Iraq. With national security emerging as the dominant campaign 
issue, both the Republican and Democratic parties, vying for victory in Congress, could 
have used the 9/11 Commission to speed up the process of intelligence reform simply for 
positive results at the ballot box. Although the election environment undoubtedly 
influenced the five variables it was not the primary driver of reform. Notably, Congress’s 
landslide final approval of the conference version of IRTPA and the President’s signature 
did not take place until after the election.117 When presented with a safe post-election 
opportunity to discard intelligence reform, Congress instead followed through 
establishing clear interest and influence in the national security policy arena.  
A final critique that merits acknowledgement involves the manner in which this 
thesis characterizes speed of action. Namely, this chapter identified the speed of action as 
fast by identifying the central starting point for intelligence reform as the 9/11 attacks that 
signified public failure of the intelligence community and the finish line as the passing of 
the IRTPA just over three years later. Although the release of the 9/11 Commission 
report had tremendous influence on Congress’s final action, it does not best represent 
Congress’s initial major interest into the intelligence community’s organization. Rather, 
Congress established the 9/11 Commission as a way to learn more about what went 
wrong prior to 9/11 and give itself an informed basis on which to design reforms. 
Alternatively, those critical of this approach may consider the more appropriate starting 
point to be the original National Security Act and therefore Congress’s speed should be 
labeled “extremely slow.” The problem with this type of approach is that it would place a 
burden on Congress to continually “reform” any agency or organization from its creation 
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onward. The sheer impracticality of Congress being able to handle such a task suggests 
that a more prudent reference point for organizational reform derives from either a clear 
violation of a congressional mandate, or a massive, clear, and public failure of that 
organization. As this chapter has shown, when measuring congressional speed from these 
types of reference points, Congress has acted swiftly on the intelligence aspect of national 
security.  
E. CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has shown two aspects of Congress’s interest and influence on 
national security by examining the sub-topic of its speed of action on intelligence reform. 
First, the historical analysis demonstrated that Congress has taken a serious and steady 
approach to intelligence reform. Rather than assume the old adage that “if reacting is 
good, then overreacting is even better,” Congress has chosen to limit its speed on 
intelligence reform to solid and calculated crisis management.  This calculated approach 
has drawn scathing criticism from reform proponents.118 Though civilian advocates 
presented strong arguments for reform, unlike Congress, they won’t be held responsible if 
their recommendations lead to massive failure. As stated earlier, even though outside 
“experts” demanded reform for many years, Congress’s speed of action should not be 
judged solely by the rate at which it appeases critics’ concerns. In other words, 
sometimes the skeptical claim that, “Congress can’t act” more accurately means 
“Congress won’t act” in a manner that suits the particular faction bringing complaint. 
Critics should consider the possibility that Congress has judged not only the failures, but 
the successes of the intelligence community, and, therefore, hesitated to quickly dismiss 
the organizational structure that led to these successes. Congress has recognized the 
complex nature of intelligence reform and has chosen to implement reform on a case by 
case basis with the 2004 IRTPA standing out as the most significant of these cases.   
Second, the five variables of constituent concern, interest groups, committees and 
subcommittees, party leadership and presidential leadership resulted in a fast speed of 
action from Congress in enacting the largest reform of the intelligence community’s 
                                                 
118 Zegart, Spying Blind, 171–177. 
 42
history. This reform occurred just over three years after the crisis of 9/11 and a mere four 
and a half months after the intelligence shortcomings were outlined in the 9/11 
Commission’s report. Shaped by the national security crisis environment, constituent 
concern and the 9/11 interest groups stand out as the most important variables in this 
case.  
In sum, Congress has clearly demonstrated increasing public interest in matters of 
intelligence, especially over the last thirty years. It has done so by quickly responding to 
perceived intelligence failures as demonstrated in the IRTPA case. Congress has 
increasingly leveraged its oversight on the intelligence community, meaning this 
influence will continue. Perhaps most astounding, Congress’s involvement in intelligence 
has brought the most secret portion of the federal bureaucracy into the public eye, an 
unparalleled feat and example of the uniqueness of the American Republic.  
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IV. THE 1986 GOLDWATER-NICHOLS DEFENSE REFORM 
A. INTRODUCTION 
Congress generally holds a much more public political relationship with the 
defense aspect of national security than the intelligence aspect. Congress’s past interest 
and influence over defense matters, however, were traditionally tied either to overarching 
war making powers or economic and budgetary concerns. The National Security Act of 
1947 marked Congress’s new interest in structural influence over the nation’s defense 
bureaucracy, which would be renewed in the 1980s. The Goldwater-Nichols Department 
of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 provides an excellent second case study for 
examining the influences that led Congress to increase its speed on a less public aspect of 
defense and national security.  
During the 1980s, the subject of defense captured the attention of Americans from 
the average voting citizen to the leaders in the executive and legislative branches. With 
the pressures of the Cold War and economic uncertainty mounting, policy makers were 
presented the unpleasant task of attempting to balance the rising costs of defense with the 
political cost of cutting back social programs. Congress could hardly ignore a popular 
President elected to repair an ailing defense capability, yet some astute lawmakers 
recognized that improving military organizational effectiveness could serve as an 
alternative solution to the defense dilemma. The Goldwater-Nichols Act emerged from 
this unique political environment.  
Congress, through Goldwater-Nichols, made sweeping changes in fundamental 
areas of defense organization. Its broad objectives included strengthening civilian 
authority, improving military advice to the President, National Security Council and 
Secretary of Defense, enhancing the role of the combatant commanders, increasing 
resource efficiency, improving joint officer management and to otherwise “enhance the 
effectiveness of military operations and improve the management and administration of 
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the Department of Defense.”119 Specifically the act made the Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) the principal military adviser, gave him significantly more control 
over his joint staff, added a Vice CJCS with the full authority of the CJCS in his absence, 
solidified the joint duty requirements for senior officers and clarified the roles of 
combatant commanders in the field and the service chiefs.120 Nearly unanimous opinion 
in the literature referenced in this chapter marks Goldwater-Nichols as the most 
significant defense reform since the National Security Act of 1947 created the 
Department of Defense.  
The first section of this chapter outlines the historical background of defense 
reform after 1947 and establishes Goldwater-Nichols as a new and fast reform effort by 
Congress spanning a little less than five years as opposed to a simple stop along a forty-
year reform road. Although the specter of Vietnam clouded the defense environment 
during the 1980s, the political environment lacked the sense of urgency present in the 
post-9/11 environment. Organizational failures impacted both defense and intelligence 
reform, but unlike the intelligence reform of 2004, Goldwater-Nichols did not occur 
during a publicly perceived national security crisis.  
The second section explores the effects of the five variables on Congress’s speed 
of action on defense reform: constituent concern, interest groups, committees and 
subcommittees, party leadership and presidential leadership. The reform environment 
fostered by the impact of these variables indicates Congress seized the opportunity to 
demonstrate influence and interest in national security affairs. Particularly important to 
the success of the Goldwater-Nichols Act were the positive forces of the armed services 
committees and their staffs in the House and Senate and the relatively neutral impact of 
constituent concern, party leadership, and presidential leadership that allowed for the 
eventual victory of pro-reform interest groups over the anti-reform groups.  
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B. DEFENSE REFORM: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
An analysis of Goldwater-Nichols by Thomas McNaugher and Roger Sperry of 
the Brookings Institute excellently summarizes what makes the act’s passage appear so 
remarkable: 
For those impressed by the incoherence and fragmentation of Congress, 
the degree of consensus generated on Capitol Hill in passing the 
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act was a 
pleasant and encouraging surprise. Congress took up an issue with which 
it was not deeply familiar (the last legislative reform having been passed 
in 1958), one on which it has historically divided sharply, and one for 
which there were no strong constituency pressures for action. Over a 
period of four years the Armed Services committees in both houses 
became familiar with the issue and ultimately passed what most would call 
thoughtful, coherent reform legislation.121 
McNaugher and Sperry are not alone in their view that Goldwater-Nichols represents an 
aberration from traditional expectations of the Congress’s interest and influence in the 
national security arena. In her study of the structural origins of the NSC, JCS and CIA, 
Amy Zegart largely discounts the role of Congress in the evolution of these three major 
security agencies, with Goldwater-Nichols standing as the odd exception. Zegart 
summarizes this outlier by stating “The truth is Goldwater-Nichols should never have 
happened. No theory or general explanation could have predicted its passage. Reform 
succeeded only because a series of factors converged at just the right moment, in just the 
right way. Had any of them been missing, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would still be hobbled 
today.”122 In contrast to Zegart’s bold claim that Goldwater-Nichols was a unique case, 
this thesis concludes that the factors that influenced Congress’s fast speed of action on 
defense reform are far from miraculous or unrepeatable. Not every “factor” was 
necessarily required to produce reform, but their combined effects did contribute to the 
fast speed at which it was accomplished. 
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1. Defense Reorganization Prior to 1982 
Before determining the speed of Congress on defense reform, however, a logical 
starting point for reform must be established. A case can be made for three main origins 
of Goldwater-Nichols. The first possibility assumes that the principles of the 1986 
reforms, including a powerful CJCS with strong authority over the joint staff, were 
intended in the establishment of the JCS in 1947, but politically impossible to implement 
due to the power of the individual armed services, leaving Congress to sit “on the 
sidelines.”123 James Locher, the influential Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) 
staff member inseparably tied to the 1986 reform, envisions it having, “ended a forty-
five-year struggle to produce a unified military establishment.”124 While the significance 
of the reform has been widely respected, this does not indicate that Congress itself was, 
or should have been, fighting this battle throughout this time. Locher himself admits that 
new changes will be needed in the present century, which suggests that subsequent 
reform should not be viewed as a continual Congressional struggle, but rather as timely 
responsiveness to military necessity.125 The massive nature of defense restructuring 
under the 1947 National Security Act should not be marked as merely a preliminary step 
for future reform. The Truman administration, Congress and the individual services, 
especially the U.S. Navy, made large compromises to get the Department of Defense, a 
new experiment in defense organization, off the ground. As such, Congress recognized 
that time would be required to determine its effectiveness and any need for future reform. 
Only in the broadest terms could Goldwater-Nichols be labeled as the finishing touch of a 
forty year reform effort by Congress. 
A second possibility marks the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 
1958 as President Eisenhower’s unfinished business in the way of defense reform.126 
Eisenhower’s major purpose was to strengthen the civilian leadership of the military by 
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increasing the influence of the Secretary of Defense. One student of that era summarized 
the reform as embodying, “the President’s ideas marked with the permanent stamp of 
Congressional influence.”127 Scholars and policy makers throughout the reform debates 
of the 1980s agree that the 1958 defense reform was the last reorganization of 
significance. Zegart claims that these reforms “were more far reaching on paper than in 
practice,” acknowledging the significance of the act but the stagnation of the 
implementation. Eisenhower himself noted the difficult road ahead for defense reform in 
his short signing statement on the 1958 Act, remarking: 
I HAVE APPROVED H. R. 12541, the Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1958. Its enactment represents a major advance in 
our organization for defense. While some time will be required for its 
complete implementation, the Secretary of Defense is beginning this 
action at once.  
In order to maintain the proper relationship of the positions of the 
President, the Congress, and the Secretary of Defense, I am instructing the 
Secretary of Defense that any report to the Armed Services Committees of 
the Congress as to changes of functions established by law, as prescribed 
in this act, shall be forwarded first to the President.  
Now that this measure has become the law of the land, I know that the 
personnel throughout the military establishment, civilian and military, will 
cooperate fully with the Secretary of Defense to assure its faithful 
execution.128 
President Eisenhower expected the reorganization to be implemented in full over time, 
rather than immediately. Eisenhower may have considered the business unfinished only 
for the executive branch, specifically the Defense Department, and satisfied with the 
statutory aid as passed by Congress.  
The internal defense budgeting and organizational changes later introduced by 
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara are indicative of the kinds of adjustments 
                                                 
127 Roger Bos, “Legislative-Executive Conflict: The 85th Congress, President Eisenhower, and the 
Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958” (Master’s thesis, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School, 
1964), 27. 
128 Dwight D. Eisenhower, “Statement by the President Upon Signing the Department of Defense 
Reorganization Act,” The American Presidency Project Online, August 6, 1958, http://www.presidency. 
ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid= 11161. 
 48
expected in 1958.129 Just as in 1947, the primary goal was to improve the effectiveness of 
the military organization and dampen the effects of inter-service rivalries through 
increased civilian authority. General Carl Spaatz, USAF (ret) illuminated the central 
theme, testifying, “In my opinion, the Defense Department never will be properly 
organized until full administrative authority is vested in the Secretary of Defense; and 
that condition is so stated in the law in no uncertain terms.”130  
Roger Bos concluded his study on the 1958 reform with a question: “The nation 
received the benefit of a workable Defense Department organization when President 
Eisenhower challenged the 85th Congress. Will we be as fortunate the next time?”131 The 
“next time” would be nearly thirty years later and in the interim period both Congress and 
the Executive continued to treat defense organization as a work in progress with no 
urgency for organizational reevaluation. Unsurprisingly, advocates of reform in the 1980s 
characterized the Eisenhower reforms as incomplete in order to advance an image of a 
long overdue reorganization.132 William Lynn and Barry Posen, part of the CSIS Defense 
Organization Project, stated, “The Eisenhower reforms culminated the postwar 
development of the joint military establishment. The structure that emerged in 1958 is, 
with only minor changes, the one operating today.”133 As a “culmination,” the 1958 
reform should be viewed as a complete reform effort with notable shortcomings, rather 
than an intermediate stage of a forty year reform.  
The third and most reasonable start marker for the Goldwater-Nichols reform 
begins with the testimony of an outgoing CJCS, General David Jones (USAF), before the 
House Armed Service Committee in February 1982 and subsequent Armed Forces 
Journal International articles in March and April written by General Jones and Army 
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Chief of Staff General Edward “Shy” Meyer respectively.134 Unlike the major 
reorganizations of 1947 and 1958 that emanated from the President, the first 
unmistakable call for modern reform was delivered to the Congress from within the 
defense bureaucracy. As General Jones himself recognized, while organizational 
frustrations had long existed, “The difference this time is that the proposals for 
improvement are coming from someone inside the system who for many years has been 
in the best position to understand the causes and consequences of its short-comings.”135 
Policy makers, bureaucrats, scholars and journalists overwhelmingly agree on Jones’s 
firestorm as the clearest trigger for the beginning of the Goldwater-Nichols reform 
movement in Congress.136 While the 1986 reform addressed problems going back as far 
as World War II, the renewed movement gained life in 1982, was brought to maturity by 
the efforts of influential lawmakers including Sen. Barry Goldwater (R-AZ), Sen. Sam 
Nunn (D-GA), Rep. Les Aspin (D-WI) and Bill Nichols (D-AL), and was signed into law 
four and half years later by President Reagan on October, 1 1986.137 Given the scale of 
the eventual reform and the stakes involved in tackling national defense, a timeline of 
less than five years to conclude the reform effort represents fast action by Congress. 
2.  Defense Reform after 1982 
A brief review of the legislative history between General Jones testimony and 
President Reagan’s signing of Goldwater-Nichols is necessary to provide a frame of 
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reference for investigating the effects of the individual variables.138 In April of 1982, the 
Investigations Subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC) initiated 
a major chain of hearings that would include “nearly a thousand pages of testimony from 
forty-three witnesses in twenty hearings.”139 These hearings represented the first major 
step in what would become a recurring trend of the House taking an initial action on 
defense reform followed by slower, more calculated moves in the Senate. At the end of 
these preliminary hearings the House passed a “modest” defense reform bill that the 
Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) held up until the end of the session 
effectively killing this first legislative effort.140  
During the spring and summer of 1983, reorganization hearings took place both in 
the HASC Investigations Subcommittee and the SASC and several versions of a House 
bill were introduced. The final version, H.R. 3718, passed in the House, but was again 
blocked by the SASC, which instead initiated a staff study on defense organization.141 In 
the next year the House, unable to get traction from the SASC, eventually attached its 
reforms to the 1985 Defense Authorization Bill to attempt to force major reorganization 
changes. These changes, however, were all but eliminated during the House-Senate 
conference.142 
The final major legislative push towards reform came on the Senate side with the 
release of the SASC staff study in October 1985 with accompanying hearings and on the 
House side with yet another reform bill that passed before the end of the year. In 1986, 
the SASC finally passed its own version of “Goldwater” reform legislation after a tough 
markup of the bill in committee. The bill would go on to be unanimously approved by the 
Senate in May. After a series of HASC hearings, the House passed a “Nichols” reform  
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bill in August, superseding the 1985 bill. This final legislation was merged with the 
Senate bill, approved by both houses of Congress in September and then signed by 
President Reagan.143 
Although the Goldwater-Nichols defense reorganization did not occur under a 
national security crisis environment such the post-9/11 case, organizational failures did 
affect the political climate. A short summary of three significant external events establish 
the environmental context of the defense reorganizational battle.  
First, although military leadership problems in Vietnam partially explain the 
growing sentiment for re-examining defense organization, they are hard to separate from 
the political issues. In April 1980, however, a tragic event took place that illuminated 
military problems independent of the political context. Operation Eagle Claw (also 
known as Desert One) was designed to use all the branches of the armed services in a 
joint effort to free the American embassy hostages from their Iranian revolutionary 
captors. Instead, at the end of the operation, poor interoperability combined with a lack of 
joint training and planning left eight servicemen dead from an aircraft collision and no 
hostages rescued.144 The connection between defense reorganization and the Desert One 
disaster would be examined more closely after Gen. Jones opened the reform debate in 
1982.145 
A second “real world” example of the defense organizational problems occurred 
on October, 23 1983 when a terrorist car bomb exploded in front of the Marine barracks 
in Beirut, Lebanon killing over 240 American service members and wounding many 
more. While the terrorist attack itself did not necessarily reveal critical weaknesses in the 
leadership structure, the poor reporting of the event by senior commanders and the JCS 
did reflect significant problems. The “confrontational” attitude of the Commandant of the  
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Marine Corps, General P.X. Kelley before the HASC afterwards compounded the 
problem and further relayed an image of an entrenched commitment to a broken system 
by military leadership.146 
Finally, only two days after the terrorist bombing in Lebanon, U.S. forces 
engaged Cuban soldiers on the island of Grenada in an operation named Urgent Fury. 
Although the operation ultimately succeeded, a host of communication and transportation 
problems between the Army and Navy left more unanswered questions about the ability 
of the services to work together effectively. Gordon Lederman summarized the overall 
outcome of these failures by concluding, “The Beirut debacle and the Grenada invasion 
did more than just produce empirical data for use by the pro-reorganization side. 
Additionally, these events also undermined the traditional respect afforded to the JCS in 
official government circles.”147 As the following review of the individual variables will 
show, although these failures did not necessarily become an issue of national urgency for 
the American public, interest groups and committees would point to them as evidence for 
a required reform of the defense community.  
C. CONGRESSIONAL SPEED OF ACTION ON DEFENSE REFORM 
A surface view of the general legislative history of defense reform perhaps 
suggests a straightforward political battle between the House and Senate, or an 
uncoordinated and sloppy effort to restructure an enormously complex organization. A 
closer examination of the influences on Congress’s speed on defense reform reveals a 
heated battle between pro-and anti-reform interest groups, strong committee involvement, 
and the general neutrality of constituent concern, party leadership and presidential 
leadership The combination of these variables allowed Congress to speed its action to a 
fast pace on reform overall and provides explanations for the temporary speed bumps 
along the way.  
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1. Constituent Concern 
The increasingly strong grip of the “pork barrel” on defense in the latter half of 
the twentieth century allowed constituent implications to drift into every aspect of the 
acquisitions and budgeting process in Congress.148 In the case of defense organizational 
reform, however, it was the lack of public interest that provided an overall neutral to 
slightly positive effect, neither slowing down, nor speeding up Congressional action. 
Beyond the mere local economic impact of defense budgets, constituents also 
demonstrated interest in broad military and defense issues in the wake of the Vietnam 
War and the uncertainty of the Cold War balance of power. Congressional pro-reform 
leaders had to deal with the challenge of translating these broad concerns into support for 
specific measures to deal with complicated military issues.149 Although the Jones and 
Meyer articles generated professional interest within Washington, the mainstream media 
was either unable or unwilling to convert the story to one of public interest.  
Arguably, more robust media interjection into the process could have affected 
Congress’s reform speed in either direction. A highly critical anti-reform author, Robert 
Previdi, suggested the Goldwater-Nichols Act “is a good example of insiders in Congress 
getting what they believe is right without the knowledge or approval of the American 
public. The press really has let the country down by not sufficiently covering this most 
important piece of legislation.”150 He based his argument on a belief that the public 
would have never allowed Goldwater-Nichols to pass if they had known about it, or 
perhaps more accurately, if the anti-reform forces maintained sufficient control of the 
story. He asserted that “key legislators like Congressman Les Aspin, Chairman of the 
House Armed Services Committee, who helped to get the legislation written and passed, 
admit the public knows nothing about it.”151 Whether this was the intent of the architects 
of reform or not presents a bit of a dilemma.  
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First, the reform followed in the wake of public interest in fraud, waste and abuse 
in the Department of Defense. Daniel Wirls considered this a key public consideration in 
the early reform debate in 1982–83 noting that “most citizens are not sure what a tank or 
bomber should cost, but they do know that a toilet seat should not cost $700 nor a claw 
hammer $435. The exposure of the parts-pricing scandals, perhaps more than any other 
issue, brought military reform to the attention of the American public.”152 No clear 
evidence demonstrates that the public directly linked Goldwater-Nichols as the solution 
to fraud, waste and abuse in the Pentagon, but the concept of general reform aimed at 
reducing overlap and increasing defense effectiveness certainly appealed to a public 
eager to see defense improvement but wary of spending costs. 
A review of the defense issues most discussed in Gallup polls during the early to 
mid-1980s reveals public interest centered on general overall spending and security with 
no specific opinion data on reform. A perceptible trend demonstrated strong public 
support for increased defense spending at the beginning of the decade that shifted, over 
the course of President Reagan’s two terms, to eventual public demand for decreases in 
the defense budget.153 This may account for the slightly increased public and media 
interest towards the end of the reform battle.  
Second, both reformers and anti-reformers desired at least a minimal amount of 
media coverage in order to present their case directly to the public with a controlled 
message. Barry Goldwater himself discussed the “absence of major media attention” as a 
positive factor in reform, in the sense that, unlike past experiences, there were no eager 
journalists seeking to turn the story into personal or political confrontations.154 In 
essence, Goldwater settled for an indifferent media that did not understand reform, since 
a neutral and explanatory media outlet never emerged.155 As reform gained momentum, 
the pro-reform leaders in Congress were able to shape what little media coverage existed.   
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After years of work, James Locher and his associates had completed their 
enormous staff report on defense reform (to be discussed in more detail later) for the 
Senate Armed Services Committee. Rather than allow an uncontrolled leak, Senators 
Goldwater and Nunn tactically engaged the media with a series of Senate floor speeches 
starting on October 1, 1985, one year before Goldwater-Nichols would be signed into 
law. Locher remarks, “The two senators believed that print and television reporting on 
reform would be overwhelmingly favorable, spark public interest, and build pressure for 
change. This would differ with the reporting of postwar debates, when influential 
journalists had opposed unification.”156 Although the reform story never fully weaved its 
way into the fabric of public attention, by 1985 it was at least recognizable as a 
significant political event that had the attention of prominent senators.157 In the end, 
Goldwater and Nunn held the advantage of controlling the story and, to a lesser extent, 
the interpretation of reform to constituents. At best, constituent influence over reform had 
a slight positive effect on increasing Congresses; at worst, constituents simply were not 
interested in the matter, allowing lawmakers to move at will. Significantly, interest 
groups limited their attempts to influence Congress to direct methods rather than taking 
their case directly to the public.  
2. Interest Groups 
While the modern 24-hour news cycle has embraced interest groups, think tanks, 
and “talking heads” as an integral part of the information age, such was not yet fully the 
case in the 1980s. Categorizing interest groups on either side of defense reform generates 
interesting questions. Perhaps most importantly, who can be fairly counted as a reform or 
anti-reform interest group? I take a non-traditional, and perhaps controversial, approach 
of recognizing the individual services (the U.S. Navy in particular) and the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense (OSD), as best fitting into the interest group variable on the anti-
reform side. Although they are part of the executive branch, the “presidential leadership” 
variable would be an inappropriate categorization, due to a lack of unequivocal public 
support from President Reagan against reform.  
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Is placing the U.S. Navy as an interest group a fair assessment? Senator 
Goldwater certainly thought it fair after he personally revealed, through a clever 
maneuver, its willingness to assume such a role. In perhaps the funniest episode of the 
reform battle, his staff once received a tipoff that the Navy had set up an office to torpedo 
the legislation. As Locher related the story:   
With mischief in his eye, Goldwater grabbed [staffer Gerald] Smith and 
me and said, “Let’s find out what this is all about.” Back in his office, 
Goldwater said, “I’m going to call this office and see what the Navy’s up 
to” . . . when his call was answered, Smith and I saw a Goldwater we had 
never seen before: an actor. Disguising his voice, Goldwater asked the 
secretary who answered, “Is this the Navy office that is working to defeat 
the reorganization legislation?” When she said, ‘Yes,’ he inquired who 
worked there.158 
The story ends with Goldwater getting her to reveal names of active duty officers 
working in the office. “As he hung, up, the senator said, ‘Can you believe that? They’re 
not supposed to lobby Congress on legislation. I can’t wait to tell the committee.’”159 As 
this anecdote suggests, the services, in particular the Navy, reached a point where rather 
than giving advice only through formal channels within the executive branch, they struck 
out on their own as interest groups.160 In fact, one could argue that this was also the case 
in 1947 and 1958, with the services attempting to lobby both Congress and the executive 
simultaneously to preserve their bureaucratic-organizational structure. Zegart recognizes 
this type of organizational influence in her new institutionalist propositions.161 While this 
thesis supports her idea of agencies as interest group influences, it does not agree that 
“Congress plays, at best, only a secondary role.”162  
The services were supported by a few “independent” advocates including the 
work of a retired Marine lieutenant general, Victor Krulak, who offered polar opposite 
solutions to the recommendations of Gen. Jones, including complete service control and 
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removal of the CJCS.163 Krulak’s book, which received the support of an anti-reform 
element of the retired military community, essentially only furthered the services’ direct 
lobbying efforts. Ultimately, the anti-reform interest groups including the services’ 
lobbying of the armed services committees and Congress as a whole failed to achieve its 
goal.  
The pro-reform interest groups that would follow up the problems proposed by 
General Jones and Meyers centered mainly on policy think tanks and former top defense 
leaders. The most influential of these outside groups was the Defense Organization 
Project of Georgetown University’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 
that “was initiated in mid-1983 on the premise that the national defense debate had 
maintained a myopic focus.”164 The CSIS study capitalized on the newfound freedom in 
policy circles to make widespread defense reform recommendations including 
strengthening the CJCS to serve “as the principal military adviser to the president, the 
secretary of defense, and the National Security Council, replacing the corporate JCS in 
that role.”165 The report of the steering committee, released in 1985, had the backing of a 
host of influential defense policy makers capped with the support and signatures of six 
former Secretaries of Defense. Although the report called for Congressional action it did 
not necessarily directly lobby Congress for such action.  
The Navy’s inability to win the interest group battle in spite of the backing of the 
Secretary of Defense may appear puzzling. Even highly respected think tanks such as 
CSIS hardly seem a formidable foe against the type of political pressure the Navy could 
levy. The problem the Navy faced was the same problem all interest groups face: 
effectively presenting their case to Congress and outlining the potential harm of a 
nonfavorable outcome. In 1947, a victorious U.S. Navy returning from World War II was 
able to convince Congress of their need to maintain autonomy and garner public support 
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for this position.166 The Navy was unable to duplicate this task during the 1980s for a 
number of possible reasons. The scale of WWII led to a public interest in military affairs 
that would be nearly impossible to duplicate, especially without a draft to keep military 
service close to home for constituents. Additionally, Zegart claims that the Navy could 
bully Truman into compromise because it was “simply too important to ignore,” further 
noting that the Navy might refuse implement any changes thrust upon it.167 The Navy 
may have indirectly exercised the deterrent threat of making President Truman seem like 
a weak Commander-in-Chief. Though still influential in the 1980s, the Navy would have 
likely had a much harder time using such a deterrent to resist reform implementation 
from President Reagan. 
Finally, the Navy, along with the rest of the Department of Defense, did not seem 
to have the ability to articulate their argument from an intellectual standpoint. Their 
efforts ranged from the radical prescriptions of Krulak, to the more common notion that 
things have worked well in the past and therefore should not change. These arguments 
fell on deaf ears for those in Congress who increasingly felt that the “broken” claim had 
been solidly established, not the least of whom were the new chairman of the SASC and 
its ranking minority member, Senators Goldwater and Nunn. The pro-reform interest 
groups, on the other hand, continued to effectively frame the intellectual argument in a 
manner Congress members could understand, even those opposed to reform. The 
potential harms of leaving the defense organization alone seemed as great if not greater 
than those of implementing major change. Therefore the pro- and anti-reform interest 
groups were surprisingly evenly matched and consequently had an overall neutral effect 
on Congress’s speed. Because of this combined neutral effect, the influence of interest 
groups paled in comparison to the influence that the House and Senate Armed Services 
Committees wielded over defense reform. 
                                                 
166 Zegart, Flawed by Design, 126–130. 
167 Ibid., 129. 
 59
3. Committees 
Congressional committees contributed to an increased speed of defense reform 
more than any of the other variables. In discussing the committee variable, this thesis 
includes both lawmakers and staffs, recognizing the interconnected, synergistic power of 
skilled and motivated staff members working with influential Congressmen. The 
strongest evidence for this arises from the clear shift of reform momentum following 
crucial changes of leadership in key committees in both houses of Congress. The HASC 
and its Investigations Subcommittee made the opening bids for reform influence that 
were consummated by the power of the SASC.  For the purposes of this study, 
determining which of these two was more influential is unnecessary. Understanding their 
combined influence over Congress’s speed matters most. 
Given General Jones’s testimony in the House as a catalyst for reform, the HASC 
received an opportunity for acting upon a major national security issue the executive had 
effectively ignored for an extended period of time. James Locher, unsurprisingly, extends 
opening credit to Archie D. Barrett, a staffer for the HASC Investigations Subcommittee. 
According to Locher, Barrett convinced the subcommittee chairman Richard C. White 
(D-TX) of the importance of capitalizing on such an opportunity. The alignment of 
White’s subsequent investigation hearings and the freshness of Jones and Meyer’s 
testimony led to near immediate reform legislation in the House with a bill being passed 
in August of 1982, mere months after Jones’s testimony. Though the legislation fell far 
short of the type of sweeping reform to come, the Investigations Subcommittee received 
no real opposition while capturing the attention of important players like Les Aspin who 
would eventually assume the HASC chairmanship and facilitate Goldwater-Nichols 
reform in the House.168 After the Investigations Subcommittee chair transitioned to Bill 
Nichols (D-AL), he maintained interest in reform and, more importantly, the staff 
continuity of Arch Barrett. Nichols along with Ike Skelton (D-MO), acting as a 
concerned rank and file HASC member, would continue the reform trend and pass 
subsequent reform legislation in 1983.169  
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Just as the influence of committees would eventually be responsible for the 
momentum shift to higher speed of action in Congress overall, a particular committee 
chairman successfully brought the process to a halt for the first few years of the reform 
debate. Sen. John Tower (R-TX) as chairman of the SASC (1981–1984) ensured that all 
early House reform action died in the Senate. His continuing service in the naval reserves 
and reputation for supporting defense may indicate personal reasons for stalling on 
reform. However, the very fact that his power as committee chair was sufficient to almost 
singlehandedly slow reform demonstrates the crucial role of the SASC and its 
chairman.170 Despite their leanings against reform, Tower and the SASC ranking 
minority member, Sen. Henry “Scoop” Jackson (D-WA), were unable to completely 
ignore the ramifications of the reorganization debate, in light of continued pressure from 
public reform advocates like former CJCS’s Gen. Jones and Gen. Maxwell Taylor (U.S. 
Army).  Tower and Jackson therefore commissioned Locher to study the issue in 1983.171 
Ironically, the resulting staff report, “Defense Organization: The Need for Change,” when 
released in 1985, ended up as the most influential of all the reform studies on the SASC 
members. Although Tower remained opposed to reform, he had assigned significant 
resources into its investigation signifying that, even in the less receptive Senate, Congress 
did not automatically defer and allow the executive to work out its internal organizational 
and spending problems alone.  
Between 1983 and 1985, the HASC continued to keep a mild form of reform 
debate alive through legislation, while the SASC allowed Locher and associates to build 
the broad case for reform. Barry Goldwater’s assumption of the SASC chairmanship in 
1985 removed the barrier to reform legislation allowing House momentum to increase 
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along with Sen. Sam Nunn, who had taken Scoop Jackson’s place as the ranking 
Democrat on the SASC. Together they pushed committee reform influence to an entirely 
new level.172 
Perhaps the greatest evidence for the committees as the driving forces behind 
reform comes from anti-reformers designating them as the enemy. Clearly, the SASC a 
whole was not a reform body. Initially it was divided nearly equally between pro-reform 
and status quo senators. Locher devotes a tremendous amount of his book to describing 
the maneuvering Goldwater and Nunn did to get the legislation through the committee. 
Goldwater and Nunn hardly expected the eventual 19–0 committee vote after a heated 
committee markup battle with 140 written and oral amendments offered, fifty-three 
coming from Navy proponent Sen. John Warner (R-VA).173 Yet, the anti-reformers 
wisely recognized Goldwater, Nunn and the SASC staff as the primary competition for 
influence. Navy Secretary Lehman went so far as to refer to the draft Senate bill as the 
“Goldwater-Locher-Dave Jones Bill” in his correspondence with Secretary of Defense 
Caspar “Cap” Weinberger.174  
During the final hearings in the House Investigations Subcommittee, after 
listening to the testimony of all the service chiefs, Rep. Nichols questioned the Army 
Chief of Staff, General Wickam, regarding his view of Goldwater and Nunn’s 
commitment to change. Wickam recommended the HASC to “move with care, and move 
slowly” regarding the Locher report, sharply responding, “If the Congress in its wisdom 
wants to listen to the people that are not involved in fighting and building fighters, the 
Nation will suffer.”175 Wickam overtly drew attention away from the plethora of 
“fighters” who provided the basis for Locher report, to set up the “real” debate as 
between the military and the “non-fighting” SASC staff. The Marine Commandant, 
General Kelley, more directly asserted, “that Senator Nunn and Senator Goldwater 
directed the staff to prepare a bill that they thought represented consensus. I’m going to 
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submit publicly, privately, and everywhere in the world—if that bill represented 
consensus from the hearings, I’m a monkey’s uncle. That bill was almost a direct 
translation from the 645-page lopsided staff report.”176 The chiefs had always seen the 
House as the larger threat, since it had been passing reform bills for four years, but as the 
SASC began to demonstrate its resolve to make major changes, the chiefs focused their 
attention on the post-legislation House hearings hoping to set up favorable conditions for 
what would emerge from a conference committee after the Senate passed a bill.177 
The committees, especially the SASC, increased reform speed through a few key 
moves. First, Goldwater made clear his personal commitment to reform as the SASC 
chairman. On the day of Weinberger’s 1985 testimony before the SASC, Goldwater 
opened the hearing by alerting Weinberger, “I only have 1 more year with this 
committee. I made the statement that it is the most important task I have ever undertaken 
and I am not going to leave here with this thing dragging its feet. You might as well tell 
your boys over there to get ready because we are going to do all we can to help you 
reorganize.”178   
Second, Goldwater and Nunn used the Locher staff study report as the primary 
reform debate centerpiece. This created dual distractions in the House and Senate for the 
anti-reformers, especially the services and Navy Secretary Lehman. The top goals sought 
by the reformers were to increase the authority of the CJCS and to improve the quality of 
joint coordination through a better joint staff. The broad problems identified by the 
Locher study as well as the independent CSIS study allowed for a host of solutions. 
Goldwater and Nunn were able to exploit the unprecedented open debate that had 
emerged in the years following Jones’s testimony.  
McNaugher and Sperry refer to these first years of reform debate as a “gestation” 
period that was pushed forward by two significant military fiascos: the bombing of the 
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Marine barracks in Beirut and the Grenada invasion.179  Nearly every study of the 
defense reform movement credits these events as real world evidence of the types of 
problems pronounced by the pro-reform actors.180 These failures fell short of a full scale 
defense “crisis,” but created a basic sense of urgency on which the HASC and SASC 
were able to capitalize. Both of these events pointed to weaknesses of JCS advice, 
communication, and decision making. The barely successful Grenada operation further 
reminded lawmakers of the depth of interoperability problems within the services. Pro-
reform studies also pointed to earlier problems in Operation Eagle Claw (Desert One), the 
disastrous attempt to rescue the American hostages in Iran in 1980.181 This connection 
provided further evidence within Congress that the Defense Department would not be 
able to implement meaningful change alone.  
Radical reorganization suggestions that might have previously been dismissed as 
“unrealistic” now required open debate. In the wake of these events and the momentum 
in Congress, the Department of Defense was forced spend a significant amount of effort 
explaining their opposition to numerous reform incarnations from the CSIS study, to the 
SASC Staff report, to the House bills already passed. With everything on the table even 
the radical suggestions had to be dealt with, which allowed for only slightly less massive 
changes to appear as compromises. Locher summarizes this strategy as follows: 
A second advantage was greater freedom to use extreme recommendations 
as part of a negotiating strategy. In seven years on Capitol Hill I had 
repeatedly witnessed the central role of compromise in congressional 
politics. If our report recommended exactly what we thought was needed 
to fix those problems, the recommendation would become the starting 
point for prolonged negotiations and weakening compromises. We thus 
would likely end up with half a loaf: an incomplete and possibly 
unworkable set of reforms.182 
Locher goes on to reveal Goldwater and Nunn dropped five of the seven “extreme 
recommendations” at the time of the final drafting of the bill once their purpose had been 
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served. “Opponents had spent several months trying to shoot them down, especially the 
one to disband the JCS. Now Goldwater and Nunn could appear statesmen-like, earn 
goodwill with opponents, and undercut antireform arguments by dropping the extreme 
proposals.”183 
Finally, Goldwater and Nunn masterfully controlled the tone of the crucial debate 
within the SASC with the vital help of Senator John Warner. Warner, as the leading 
opponent of reform with the distinctive credential of having served as Navy Secretary, 
could have reframed the debate in partisan terms, and possibly sunk reform altogether. 
Instead, as Locher points out, “When Warner, a sincere and considerate gentleman, 
matched the two leaders’ tone, the ingredients for a productive examination of the bill 
were present.”184 Warner’s fifty-three amendments acted not as blockades, but as a way 
of shoring up the most important elements of defense reorganization. In the end Warner 
“won admiration for the way he led the opposition. He thoroughly challenged every idea 
and ensured that the Pentagon’s perspective on each issue was well represented, but he 
was not intransigent.”185 The sixty percent of his amendments that passed did not alter 
the major reform goals, but did show how an open dialogue built such a powerful bill and 
no doubt led to the astonishing 95–0 vote to pass the bill on the Senate floor.186 
Goldwater, as chairman, also set a tone of seriousness on the matter and forced debate by 
stopping all other action on defense matters. He put a hold on military promotions, 
executive nominations and budget concerns until the SASC markup session was 
complete.187  
The powerful armed services committees and the House Investigations 
Subcommittee positively affected the speed of reform action through the power of their 
staffs and the influential chairmen and ranking members. Not only did the committees 
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foment interest in a complex aspect of national security, but they also managed to 
maintain a high level of serious debate over crucial military issues. 
4. Party Leadership 
Goldwater, Nunn, Nichols and Aspin protected the reform debate from the 
stranglehold of partisan politics. Their respected pro-defense political reputations partly 
accounted for this achievement, and their constant wariness of the danger of such a 
digression solidified their goal. With a Republican controlled White House and Senate, 
and Democratically controlled House, the debate seemed ripe for being bogged down in a 
power struggle by party leadership, a fact that was not missed by those on either side. 
Locher notes that, “[Navy Secretary] Lehman repeatedly charged that Democrats were 
going to make reform a political issue. Like Goldwater and Nunn, he understood that the 
reorganization campaign could not withstand the burdens of partisan politics.”188 
This is not to say that party affiliation was completely insignificant. Some 
Republican lawmakers may have considered the legislation to be party oriented in the 
sense that a massive overhaul of the Department of Defense would reflect a failure on the 
part of President Reagan’s close friend Secretary Weinberger, despite the continued 
assurance of Goldwater and Nunn otherwise. John Warner, as previously argued, would 
have been in the ideal position to transform the issue into a party one, but he nobly 
refrained from this tactic. Ultimately, reform opponents were never able to reduce the 
debate to a strict party one, party leaders never engaged the issue on their own and the 
impact of the party leadership variable remained a neutral force on speed.189 
5. Presidential Leadership 
The presidential leadership variable, in the case of Goldwater-Nichols reform, 
maintained a neutral effect: it did not advance the increased speed from Congress, but 
neither did it restrain the speed. President Reagan was unwilling to use his full power to 
unleash the enormous potential to hinder Congress’s momentum. Reagan, from the 
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beginning, wisely maintained a sideline stance on the defense reform issue. He let his 
public support and approval of Weinberger speak for itself, but also carefully distanced 
himself from the opposition by commissioning the neutral Packard Commission in July 
of 1985 to investigate the defense reform issue. Mark Perry notes that both pro-reformers 
and the Defense Department thought the Packard Commission would validate their 
conclusions, especially Secretary Weinberger, who turned out to be gravely mistaken.190  
Furthermore, the Packard Commission maintained an open dialogue with the reform 
movement in Congress and “throughout this dialogue, one common agenda united the 
commission and the SASC: achieving changes that would be best for the nation’s 
security. There was never a hint of executive-legislative competition, partisan politics, or 
concern about who got the credit.”191 Reagan ensured that the issue never became one of 
Republican influence and never admitted its implications as a legislative bid for more 
power in the national security arena. While Goldwater-Nichols clearly represents 
Congress demonstrating its influence and interest in a previously unexplored area of 
national security policy, it did not indicate a public bid for Constitutional power, which 
would have likely slowed reform. The executive would retain its existing authority, and 
Congress was only trying to change how it was structured to exercise that authority.  
President Reagan’s relatively open stance on defense reform allowed for a fast 
speed from Congress. Had he been wholeheartedly behind it, it would have been even 
faster. Instead, he allowed the committee and interest group variables to drive the speed 
of reform. One possible critique to this approach might not allow for the President to 
“duck out of the fight,” considering that major influence over an executive agency, in this 
case the Department of Defense, forces the President to accept the implications of a 
reduction in overall executive power. This critique would stem from the type of “unitary 
executive” model embraced by the second Bush administration. Since Reagan had not 
bound himself to such a model, he could assume the role of a faithful executive with a 
primary goal of making the nation more secure through defense.  
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Another miscalculation would be to view the administration as homogenously 
anti-reform. Though Weinberger’s voice may have had top access to the President’s ear, 
his voice was not the only one. Beyond the military members willing to come forward on 
the side of reform, another significant body within the executive privately understood its 
importance. Reagan’s National Security Advisor, Bud McFarlane, and other members of 
the NSC staff acknowledged the momentum in Congress and recognized the need for 
executive action. Locher’s credits McFarlane as a crucial player in bringing about the 
independent Packard Commission.192 A unified NSC, OSD, and armed services with the 
full support of the president against the reform movement would have likely severely 
retarded Congress’s speed. This combined front never occurred. Pro-reform members 
within the NSC and other areas of the administration kept publicly neutral and their 
silence helped to balance Reagan’s view on reform in spite of the opposition forces 
within the Department of Defense.  
Reagan also enjoyed the personal reputation of putting defense first, which gave 
him the leeway to embrace reform as a function of defense improvement. The defense 
reform movement did not put his friend Caspar Weinberger’s leadership on the table, but 
rather a long-term set of problems. Reagan had staked his 1980 campaign on the need to 
challenge the status quo of the national defense and won. Connecting the reform 
movement to the larger picture of improving lengthy defense problems of the JCS role 
and joint warfighting allowed Reagan to pitch Goldwater-Nichols as pro-defense. As 
Gordon Lederman wrote, “The Packard Commission’s existence prevented Secretary 
Weinberger from enlisting President Reagan’s support to combat the pro-reorganization 
movement because the Commission’s existence suggested President Reagan’s discomfort 
with the status quo of DoD’s management.”193  
Reagan, effectively, could accept Goldwater and Nunn’s continual assurances that 
they had no problems with Weinberger’s leadership (other than his unwillingness to 
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explore reform).194 Weinberger, on the other hand, appeared unable to accept the 
divorcing of defense reform from his personal leadership of the Department.195 Perry 
writes, “While Weinberger continually characterized it as a tacit critique of his 
capabilities—and a typical Washington turf battle—reform advocates refused to be drawn 
in.”196 Interestingly, his autobiography, detailing all of his seven years as Defense 
Secretary, avoids the topic altogether. Readers of his book alone would have no idea that 
during these Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon, it underwent the largest reorganization 
since 1947, that he opposed it, or that a person named Barry Goldwater ever existed.197 
Barring an extremely selective memory, one is left to assume that reform was an 
unequivocal loss for him politically and one he had no desire to recount, perhaps 
mistakenly assuming that his political loss reflected one for Reagan as well.198  
Weinberger’s reputation for wise spending and budgeting reforms made him an 
excellent candidate to have been the first to embrace reform. Some have noted that if he 
had initiated major reform in the wake of General Jones’s testimony, there is a high 
probability that Congress would have let the Department of Defense run with it.  This 
possibility is especially provocative given the history of autonomy Congress had 
extended to the Department over the last thirty years. As Locher suggests, “An early 
compromise with Weinberger would have appealed to Capitol Hill, where a solid reason 
for delaying action on a controversial measure is often popular.”199 With the likely full 
support of President Reagan, the counterfactual story may have ended with this study 
pointing to presidential leadership as the primary variable leading to increased speed 
from Congress. As we have seen, however, Weinberger instead fought to the bitter end 
and the committees drove the fight. Barry Goldwater was perhaps overly gracious in 
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asserting, “Cap Weinberger and the President did not try to cut us of at the pass. They 
supported us once we made our objectives clear.”200 More accurately he adds the 
following caveat: “Both also knew they could not defeat the measure.”201 
When the reform movement had reached an apex with both a House passed bill 
and a Senate bill unanimously approved by the SASC in 1986, President Reagan could 
publicly favor the general reform movement. Just a few days before the Senate’s 
unanimous vote to pass the Goldwater Act in May of 1986, Reagan sent a bland message 
to Congress, reported by the New York Times as “Reagan’s first direct entry into the 
running battle on Capitol Hill over the organization of the Pentagon.”202 Though direct, it 
was hardly a major move as the President in the same message showed support for the 
important proposals such as making the CJCS the President’s principal military adviser. 
Reagan merely continued to frame the debate in terms of overall defense effectiveness 
improvement recommended by a large body of study including his own directed Packard 
Commission. Reagan kept the defense reform from ever appearing as a loss of executive 
influence over national security at the hands of an “imperial Congress.” Perhaps in the 
end, this helped his presidency survive Congress’s drastically more public move for 
control of national security in the wake of the Iran-Contra scandal. 
D. POSSIBLE CRITIQUES 
Overall accusations of a disinterested and ineffective Congress on defense 
organization can be addressed in the same way as they were in the case of intelligence 
reform. Like the 2004 intelligence reform, a distinction must be made between 
Congressional apathy and delegated autonomy. As demonstrated in the background 
section, from 1947 to 1982 Congress generally deferred to the executive to implement the 
centralized defense organization it enacted in 1947 and reemphasized in 1958. The 
advocates for reform within the executive and the external failures eventually linked to 
organizational problems opened an opportunity for Congress to introduce organizational 
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principles that had nominally been recognized as necessary by past Presidents and 
defense secretaries. In other words, the long period of time without major defense 
reorganization does not reflect an inability of Congress to influence security in the 
defense arena, but rather a choice to allow the executive to attempt to implement past 
legislative actions. 
A more compelling critique might suggest that rather than the combination of 
positive and neutral variables affecting Congressional speed, a single variable accounts 
almost exclusively for the increased speed of action. If the proposed variable would have 
been removed, defense reform would have failed. The two variables that might fall into 
this category are presidential leadership and the influence of the committees. 
A first counterfactual scenario involves President Reagan having exerted both 
persuasive and political power to prevent defense reform. The eventual overwhelming 
Congressional vote in favor of Goldwater-Nichols indicates that by 1986 a presidential 
veto could not have overturned reform.203 Had Reagan placed his full weight against 
reform earlier, however, would it have been enough to completely stall out the 
movement? The question itself invokes a second problem: President Reagan’s use of 
persuasive powers most likely would have brought a large amount of media attention, and 
set up a major battle between the President and the Congress for influence over the 
defense establishment, as opposed to the smaller feud, which actually occurred between 
the Department of Defense and Congress. Expanding media involvement would have 
then shifted more importance to the constituent concern variable, thereby reducing the 
overall importance of the presidential leadership variable. Reagan’s communication skills 
may have led to public support for the President’s rights to protect his defense 
bureaucracy. Alternatively, the opposite effect may have occurred. The public aided by 
the media may have determined, as Congress had, that organizational problems had led to 
poor military operations and would continue to do so, therefore characterizing the 
President a stubborn proponent of a broken system. Defense reform under this scenario 
may have even happened faster. Although we cannot determine which direction a media 
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driven executive-legislative contest for defense organization would have pushed public 
opinion, a full-fledged anti-reform Reagan could not have been an exclusive variable for 
slowing reform because of its indirect impact on the constituent concern variable. 
A second counterfactual scenario would basically give full credit for reform to the 
main Congressional committee leaders: Nichols, Aspin, Goldwater and Nunn. As this 
paper has shown, the committee variable did have the greatest impact on Congressional 
speed, but divorced from the other variables it may have had considerably less clout. 
Consider, as one counterfactual, the Republican Party leadership rising in opposition to 
Senator Goldwater in the Senate and undercutting the bipartisan nature of defense reform. 
Nunn, although influential, would have hardly been able to go it alone as SASC ranking 
member, and Congressional speed may have been reduced to waiting for a Democratic 
capture of the Senate in order to reinvigorate debate. The personal leadership within the 
committees may have not been sufficient to increase Congressional speed on reform 
without the neutrality of the variable of party leadership. The final critique focuses on 
whether or not it was necessary to gain any movement at all. 
This last critique follows Amy Zegart’s previously discussed hypothesis, that the 
absence of even one positive factor in defense reform would have completely halted the 
reform.204 What this critique fundamentally reveals is the intricacy of how these variables 
work together. All of the variables have the ability to additively increase or decrease 
Congress’s speed of action. Zegart’s approach, however, assumes each input into the 
system has the independent ability to either start or stop Congressional action altogether. 
This theory relies on a view of the history of Congressional action that assumes that the 
way in which reform actually happened is the only way reform could have happened. The 
counterfactuals presented above imply that changes to the variables will result in changes 
of speed, yet a single variable is unlikely to have the power to completely stop reform 
due to the possibility of other variables to counteract new inputs. Although we cannot test 
how all of these scenarios would have played out, the shifting of variables demonstrated 
within this single case study (such as the SASC leadership changeover from Tower to 
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Goldwater)  show how each variable, whether positive, negative or neutral, affects 
Congress’s speed rather than affecting a simple binary option to act or not act. 
E. CONCLUSIONS 
President Reagan’s signing statement on the 1986 reform deftly endorsed the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act as a joint, interagency and interbranch measure: 
I have today signed H.R. 3622, the Goldwater-Nichols Department of 
Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. This legislation is the product of a 4-
year effort led by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees. It is 
a milestone in the long evolution of defense organization since our 
national security establishment was created in 1947. Our thanks go to 
Senators Barry Goldwater and Sam Nunn, Representatives Bill Nichols, 
Ike Skelton, John Kasich, and Larry Hopkins, Secretary Weinberger, 
David Packard, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and many others for their 
patience and perseverance in this effort.  
After long and intense debate, we have set a responsible course of action 
by taking another important step forward, building on improvements 
underway since 1981, and affirming the basic wisdom of those who came 
before us—the Forrestals, Bradleys, Radfords, and Eisenhowers—
advancing their legacy in the light of our own experience.205 
Notably, by marking the internal changes begun in 1981 and naming Eisenhower, Reagan 
suggests that like the 1947 and 1958 reorganizations, Goldwater-Nichols reforms were 
executive initiated changes with help where needed from the U.S. Congress. While 
reformers were justifiably appalled by a signing statement that praised the efforts of some 
of the staunchest opponents of reform, such as Weinberger and Forrestal, Reagan had 
brilliantly managed to publicly divert attention away from the strength of Congress’s 
influence in a crucial area of national security. As the media and general public had not 
followed the issue closely, perhaps the assertion seemed completely plausible. As this 
chapter has shown, however, the four-year reform effort that ended in 1986 represented 
Congress demonstrating its influence and interest in national security matters. The 
powerful forces of the House and Senate Armed Services Committees and interest groups 
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were unhindered by the neutral influences of constituent concern, party leadership and 
presidential leadership allowing Congress to move quickly and decisively with both 
















This thesis explored the question of Congress’s interest and influence in national 
security affairs and concludes that an important, but often neglected, approach to 
understanding this interest and influence is examining Congress’s speed of action. 
Specifically, this thesis proposed a method of analyzing this speed by studying how the 
following five key variables affect it: constituent concern, interest groups, committees, 
party leadership and presidential leadership. This method was applied to two case studies 
of organizational reform of national security agencies. The defense and intelligence 
reform cases illustrated that the combination of neutral and positive variables led to an 
increased speed of action from Congress. A brief comparison of the cases will outline 
similarities and differences in the variables as well as the surrounding political and 
security environments.    
B. DEFENSE AND INTELLIGENCE REFORM COMPARED 
The intelligence reform of 2004 did not follow the exact path of the defense 
reorganization nearly twenty years earlier. The Cold War political environment of the 
1980s, though tense, fell far short of the urgency felt in the post-9/11 national security 
crisis environment in which IRTPA was enacted. In spite of the environmental 
differences, however, Congress’s speed of action increased steadily in both cases leading 
to defense reform in just under four years and intelligence reform in just over three. A 
brief review of each of the five variables’ impact on the two cases will demonstrate 
similarities in Congress’s overall speed and also account for the slight differences. 
Together these cases provide evidence that Congress does not need all variables to act 
positively. Speed increases rapidly with only one or two overall positive influences as 
long as the other variables remain neutral. Additionally, some of the variables did not 




to the conventional wisdom that Congress needs massive prodding to engage in the 
national security arena, these cases indicate Congress can also move energetically when 
potential obstacles remain neutral.  
1. Constituent Concern 
Constituent concern stands out as one of the largest differences between the two 
reforms. While it remained neutral to slightly positive during the defense reform 
movement, it greatly influenced the increased speed of action on intelligence reform.  
Environmental change best accounts for this difference, for two reasons. First, the trigger 
event for intelligence reform, the 9/11 attacks, was nationally recognizable by a populace 
who demanded an accounting of their government officials, including Congress. The 
public became nearly instantly aware of the problem and its magnitude leading to a 
national security crisis environment. Additionally, the failure to protect the homeland 
struck a deeper chord with more Americans than failures such as the Marine barracks 
bombing in Lebanon or the Grenada debacle, which, though tragic, were distant and less 
understood. The environment at the time of Gen. David Jones’s testimony, which 
triggered defense reform, had none of these crisis attributes.  
Second, the information environment changed drastically in the two decades 
following Goldwater-Nichols. These changes allowed for faster and wider media 
dissemination than was possible in the early 1980s. Pinning partial responsibility for the 
9/11 attacks on the intelligence community was relatively easy. The link between the 
failure to “connect the dots” and suffering a terrorist attack was simple to grasp compared 
to the complexity of the relationship between military operational failures and 
organizational defense reform. The media was able to incorporate the intelligence story 
as part of the larger terrorism theme and direct public attention towards the reform 
movement. More media attention at information age speeds does not, however, 
automatically ensure a positive effect on Congress’s speed. In fact, as previously 




A media framework favoring the position of the Department of Defense could have 
pushed constituent concern against reform and may have ultimately slowed Congress’s 
speed.  
Although constituent concern affects Congress’s speed of action on security 
matters just as in other policy areas, it is not the all powerful driving force painted by 
skeptics. While it positively influenced intelligence reform speed, Goldwater-Nichols 
showed that security legislation does not simply result from an attempt to appease 
constituents in order to secure reelection.  
2. Interest Groups 
Congress reasonably expects to encounter interest groups on either side of a 
security policy debate. At times, they will be evenly matched resulting in an overall 
neutral influence on Congress’s speed; at other times one side may gain an advantage. 
Quite unexpectedly, in the defense debate one may have expected the power of a retired 
officer corps backing an anti-reform Defense Secretary and JCS to have held the upper 
hand, but in fact, the stronger intellectual grounding of the reform interest groups evened 
the debate. This resulted in an overall neutral influence, which allowed the committees to 
take the lead. The crisis interest groups that helped drive the speed of intelligence reform, 
on the other hand, were not only public, but a by-product of an increasing constituent 
concern.  
Neither the Navy nor the 9/11 families were traditional interest groups fitting the 
model of a general domestic policy lobby. They did not focus their efforts on campaign 
contributions or widespread control of the media. They did, however, transparently 
represent an interested faction and worked hard to frame the debate for Congress. The 
Goldwater-Nichols interest group battle was hard fought to a basic standstill allowing the 
committee variable to increase Congress’s speed. The intelligence reform interest groups 
had a somewhat easier road, never encountering resistance anything near the scale of 
military pushback against Goldwater-Nichols. Although the reasons for this weaker 
resistance are unclear, one possibility might be a lack of experience in resisting 
organizational reform. While the armed services, arguably, resisted organizational 
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changes for 200 years, the intelligence community and its interest group supporters 
traditionally focused on protecting its secrecy and operations to include sources and 
methods. The organizational nature of the 2004 reform did not clearly endanger these 
past interests. Opponents of reform, therefore, may simply not have been adept at 
effectively explaining why organizational reform threatened their overall effectiveness.  
While this explains the case of the CIA and smaller intelligence agencies, the 
Department of Defense stands out as an exception to this hypothesis considering its 
experience in amassing opposition support against organizational reform. For this reason, 
many of the key compromises of the 2004 intelligence reform, such as restraints on the 
DNI’s budget and personnel authority, were made in deference to the Defense 
Department. Overall, the influence of the crisis-driven interest groups exceeded that of 
the Department of Defense and the latter, unable to significantly slow or stop the 
intelligence reform momentum, was forced to settle for limited concessions instead. 
The information environmental changes are not insignificant to an interest group’s 
ability to present its case to Congress; however, the new and faster paced environment 
does not favor one interest group over another. Both sides in any debate will enjoy the 
benefits of twenty-first century communication technology. Interest groups will retain the 
potential to be powerful influences on Congress’s speed of action in future security 
policy decisions.  
3. Committees 
The powerful armed services committees of the House and Senate significantly 
influenced Congress’s increased speed on the Goldwater-Nichols defense reform. 
Likewise, the intelligence committees positively affected the IRTPA reform, though not 
to the same degree they had affected previous changes like those in the Church era. These 
cases also require a short discussion of the political environments in which they took 
place. Though not at the height of their power, committees during the 1980s, while on the 
decline, were more powerful than those of the early twenty-first century. Thomas Mann 
and Norman Ornstein, in their lament over the alleged “Broken Branch,” identify a 
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reform movement of the congressional committee system that started in the late 1960s 
with slow change over the next twenty years.206  
Goldwater-Nichols could be characterized as one of the last hurrahs of the age of 
committees, or alternatively it may have been the first triumph of the “weaker” current 
committee model. Chapter IV demonstrated that, while influential, Barry Goldwater was 
well past the days when a chairman could simply muscle the rest of the committee into 
fast action. He and the SASC staff had to engage both the Department of Defense and the 
rest of the Congress in a heated battle. The SSCI during the time of intelligence reform 
did not use the force that Goldwater’s SASC had employed, but this may simply be 
because it was unnecessary. The SSCI took the opportunity to be the stamp of approval 
on a concept that generated much greater widespread support than defense reorganization 
had enjoyed.  
Future studies should also recognize that individual committees and 
subcommittees have unique characteristics and can change over time. The history of 
intelligence reform chronicled the rising power of the intelligence committees over the 
years, in part accounting for their influence in 2004. The House and Senate Committees 
on Homeland Security may play a large role (positive or negative) in the speed of the 
next generation of security decisions, or may wield little influence. In sum, committees 
played a positive role on congressional speed in both cases, and will continue to be an 
important variable for case specific examination.  
4. Party Leadership 
The most controversial findings of this study may be the assertion that the party 
leadership variable remained a neutral force on speed in both cases. The more common 
theme today supposes, as James Pfiffner does, “In the latter quarter of the twentieth-
century, Congress was transformed from a relatively consensual institution with 
significant overlap between the Democratic and Republican parties to an ideological, 
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and How to Get It Back on Track (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 52–64. 
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polarized battlefield with virtually no middle ground.”207 Pfiffner claims this polarized 
environment affects not only domestic social policy, but security policy, specifically with 
regards to overseas military campaigns such as Afghanistan and Iraq.208 While growing 
partisan polarization is difficult to ignore, it is not the definitive single variable in 
determining Congress’s interest and influence on national security, as these two cases 
demonstrated. 
In both the Goldwater-Nichols and the IRTPA reforms, political space existed to 
maneuver in a bipartisan manner as the near unanimous support for both bills on the floor 
eventually proved. An alternative characterization may consider these cases as examples 
of bipartisan neutrality rather than bipartisan support. In both cases anti-reformers 
unsuccessfully attempted to twist the debate into a partisan one. Had they been 
successful, the likely result would have been a much slower speed from Congress. Even 
overwhelming support for reform by the ruling party does not necessarily promote a 
faster speed, as it can engender greater entrenchment by the opposing party leading to 
various delays, and a likely secondary impact on the variables of constituent concern, 
committees, and presidential leadership. The defense and intelligence reform successes 
suggest that a neutral party leadership variable may have the greatest probability of 
fostering a faster speed from Congress on national security issues. 
5. Presidential Leadership 
Presidential leadership represents the least understood variable. Though this thesis 
does not deny the existence of a struggle for influence between the President and 
Congress, the struggle on national security matters can be indirect and, at times, 
temporarily laid aside. The modern cynic, doubtful of the ability of the President and 
Congress to ever work together, would benefit from consideration of the type of 
“intermixture of powers” envisioned by Alexander Hamilton in his defense of the roles of 
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both the President and Senate in treaty making.209 Hamilton recognized “. . . the joint 
possession of the [treaty] power in question, by the President and the Senate would afford 
a greater prospect of security than the separate possession of it by either of them.”210 At 
the time Hamilton was writing the treaty power was arguably the most crucial of all 
national security powers considering the weak state of the military. Hamilton understood 
that, in spite of the intentional power struggle designed by the Constitution, the Congress 
and President could and would work together on matters of the utmost national security 
to the benefit of the nation. The curious presidential compliance in the Goldwater-
Nichols and IRTPA reforms, therefore, should not be as surprising as many have 
considered it to be.  
Both cases involved presidents with early reluctance towards reorganization of 
their executive security agencies by Congress, but generally neutral stances as Congress 
picked up speed. Both Reagan and Bush were also able to effectively assume partial 
credit for the respective reforms at the end of the process. The presidential strategy to 
ultimately embrace these security reforms prevented the external appearance of a 
diminishment of the powers of the executive office. Ironically, the strategy of allowing 
Congress to take the main initiative protected executive national security powers as 
effectively, if not more, than Eisenhower’s personal initiation of the 1958 defense reform. 
Presidential popularity varied widely between the two cases as well, with Reagan 
near the height of his popularity and Bush, though having won the 2004 election, nearer 
to the middle of his downward spiral.211 Both defense and intelligence were hot topics for 
the two presidents respectively, which may account for their careful management of the 
issues. Neither president wanted to be viewed as an obstruction to the improvement of 
important national security agencies. Whether the public would have backed an anti-
reform effort based on presidential leadership remains to be seen, but the risk of a 
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backlash outweighed the benefits of such a course. A more optimistic view concludes that 
both presidents actually did desire quality reorganizations to ensure greater national 
security, and the constructive debate within Congress helped to create a more positive 
image of reform in the minds of the two reluctant chief executives. Whether the 
pessimist’s or optimist’s argument appeals more, the end result was the same. The 
presidential leadership effect on Congress’s speed was neutral, allowing an increase in 
reform momentum. 
6. Summary 
The cases of the Goldwater-Nichols defense reorganization and the IRTPA 
intelligence reform suggest a non-traditional model of Congress’s speed of action on 
national security issues. Overwhelmingly positive influences are not needed for Congress 
to increase its speed. Instead, one or two positive variables in conjunction with other 
neutral variables are sufficient to move Congress to faster action. The armed services 
committees were the driving force behind defense reform in the 1980s, especially after 
the key changeovers in the chairmen’s seats. The 2004 intelligence reform benefitted 
from the additional overall positive influences of constituent concern and interest groups 
in addition to the minor positive force of the SSCI.  These additional positives account 
for the small difference in Congress’s speed in the two cases.  
The last three variables, committees, party leadership, and presidential leadership, 
while related, are not permanently interconnected, as some might argue. Inadvertently, 
the Republican control of both branches of Congress in the twenty-first century gave the 
appearance that these three variables should be viewed as a single force driving policy. 
The generally identical security goals of President Bush, the Republican Party and its 
allegedly weak committee leaders in the early 2000s were an exceptional case, however, 
and should not suggest that these variables will always work in harmony. While 
procedural changes in Congress may continue to lessen the impact of the committee 
variable, such changes are not necessarily permanent. Furthermore, the first year of the 
Obama administration reintroduced a striking independence of party leadership from 
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presidential leadership. In that regard, the next major security question may resemble 
Goldwater-Nichols much more than the IRTPA reform.  
C. AREAS FOR FURTHER APPLICATION 
This limited study explored two cases of Congress demonstrating interest and 
influence over national security policy, specifically in the area of structural 
reorganization. The proposed Congressional speed model of analysis can also be 
effectively applied to a much larger body of cases such as treaty ratification, declarations 
of war, and authorizations of military force. Two brief examples for further application 
are the War Powers Resolution of 1973 and organizational reform within the Department 
of State. 
The literature review marked the War Powers Resolution as a major event in the 
study of presidential-congressional relations. As such, it would make an excellent case 
for applying the model of analyzing the five variables’ impact on Congressional speed in 
this crucial area of national security on two levels. First, given the enormous 
Constitutional implications of the act, determining why Congress increased its speed of 
action on a 200-year-old issue might shed light on other longstanding unresolved security 
questions. Second, it would pave the way for individual studies of the authorizations of 
force before and after its implementation. Such studies would be especially useful to 
determine what effect the War Powers Resolution itself may have had on the five 
variables. For example, did the War Powers Resolution set in motion changes to the way 
constituent concern or presidential leadership affect Congress’s speed? 
A second case for further review would examine efforts to reform another 
important agency of national security: the Department of State. Considering the vast 
interagency problems in the reconstruction of Iraq after 2003, one is left to wonder 
whether or not the State Department will be Amy Zegart’s next “flawed” target for 
reform. If so, the story told will likely be subject to the same misinterpretations of 
Congress’s speed. Researching the history of State Department reforms dating back to 
1946 is likely to reveal a similar pattern to the defense and intelligence reforms, with a 
few distinctive differences.  
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First, internally driven changes tend to pacify Congress when interest groups, 
constituents and presidents remain silent. Recall James Locher’s theory that had 
Secretary Weinberger shown more effort to initiate major internal defense changes, 
Goldwater-Nichols may have never happened.212 True, a motivated individual lawmaker 
may stoke debate within a party or committee, but cannot singlehandedly increase 
Congress’s speed. The State Department, on the prompting of President Nixon, made 
major internal changes in the 1970s with the belief that the Foreign Service Act of 1946 
was “. . . fundamentally sound and just as appropriate for the problems of the seventies as 
it was for the problems of the fifties.”213 The six-hundred page reform plan, Diplomacy 
for the 70s, likely kept Congress at bay until the end of the decade, allowing the State 
Department time to refine the changes it determined would require legislative assistance. 
By 1979, Secretary of State Cyrus Vance was ready to present those changes to Congress. 
Piggybacking on the successful implementation of the 1978 Civil Service Reform Act, 
Congress and the State Department passed a major change to the Foreign Service Act by 
1980.214 The 1980 Act included a variety of management changes within the personnel 
structure including the establishment of a Senior Foreign Service to serve as “the corps of 
leaders and experts for the management of the Service and the performance of its 
functions.”215 Other changes involved setting the stage for future integration of the U.S. 
Information Agency (USIA) and the U.S. Agency for International Development 
(USAID) by including them on a newly established Board of the Foreign Service.216  No 
doubt the presence of a past advocate of organizational reform, Sen. Frank Church, as the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee chairman positively influenced rapid action by 
Congress.  
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Second, in the 1990s State Department reform took on a different aspect than the 
defense and intelligence battles as the party and presidential leadership variables played a 
much larger role. Sen. Jesse Helms (R-NC) as Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee in conjunction with then Sen. Joseph Biden (D-DE) made a strong push for a 
bipartisan reform beginning in 1997 after previous attempts in 1995 and 1996 had 
failed.217 The final outcome of the reform involved the abolishment of USIA, USAID 
and the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as separate entities, incorporating 
their functions into the Department of State.218 More generally, the Foreign Affairs 
Agencies Consolidation Act of 1998 reorganization intended “to maximize the efficient 
use of resources, which may lead to budget savings, eliminated redundancy in functions, 
and improvement in the management of the Department of State,” as well as to 
strengthen “the leading role of the Secretary of State in the formulation and articulation 
of United States foreign policy.”219 The reform act was finally signed by President 
Clinton embedded within a massive emergency omnibus bill on October 21, 1998.220 The 
topic of State Department reform would be briefly revisited once more in early 2001 
before more pressing problems, highlighted by the 9/11 attacks, overshadowed the 
subject.221 Overall, the 1990s State Department reform case would be an excellent area 
for future study and application of this thesis’s analytical framework. 
The benefit of expanding upon this study by examining a wider range of past 
cases is better predictive quality for future congressional involvement in national security 
affairs. Policy makers with specific security decisions, whether organizational reform of a 
security agency or the potential use of force, would not have to rely on finding a “model” 
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case study to determine at what speed Congress is likely to act.222  Instead, they could 
look to the five variables outlined in this thesis, in the context of the political and security 
environment, and make a more informed plan for gaining Congress’s support through 
faster action. Most importantly, policy makers must not discount the interest and 
influence of Congress in national security affairs. 
D. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE SECURITY POLICY 
Congress plays a vital role in the formation of national security policy. This thesis 
has included the views of those who have diminished this role, as well as those who have 
elevated its role too high. A principal finding of Amy Zegart’s study of the national 
security agencies asserted, “the Congress appears to be much weaker and more 
insignificant than most political scientists generally admit.”223 The findings of this author 
require a categorical rejection of Zegart’s conclusion, which suggests only a marginal 
value of Congress in national security matters. She does, however, qualify this claim with 
the key word “appears.” Zegart’s bold assertion must be viewed in light of the “strong 
Congress” generation of scholars before her. More accurately, when Congress appears 
weak on the surface, greater care must be taken in examining its speed of action. 
Congress, rather than constantly micromanaging the affairs of the national security 
agencies has allowed the executive time to implement specific reforms, assessed 
successes or failures and then quickly reacted when required. This model will not assuage 
critics with strong normative intentions for unceasing congressional meddling in every 
corner of national security structure and policy. Those who need only assurance that 
Congress maintains a healthy interest and influence in this area should, however, take 
heart in this thesis’s findings.  
Ideally, policy makers looking at the next major changes in the U.S. national 
security arena would attempt to inject legislation at a time when all five variables are 
likely to have a positive impact on Congress’s speed, perhaps due to an unexpected and 
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highly favorable political or security environment. Such a perfect case is unlikely and, at 
the same time, unnecessary. As this study has shown, instead policy makers, including 
legislators, should look for opportunities when most of the variables are likely to be 
stable and neutral, allowing for intentional positive change in one or two of them.  
For example, those desiring a major reform of the State Department might look 
for a party and President who are neutral towards reform and enlist the media to stir up 
constituent concern or interest groups to frame the debate. Another possibility would be 
for a concerned committee or subcommittee member to engage the committee leadership, 
ideally in a bipartisan manner, at a time when all other variables are generally neutral. 
Admittedly, the more sweeping the desired changes, the more difficult it will be to find 
neutral variables. A complete reworking of interagency relations, for example, between 
all government organizations responsible for any aspect of national security would be less 
likely to encounter a favorable variable set than an individual agency reform. On security 
decisions of this magnitude, however, it is helpful to remember that potential obstacles 
such as interest groups can be neutral for two reasons.  Interest groups may be neutral 
because no groups are concerned with the change or, as Goldwater-Nichols proved, they 
can take on an overall neutral quality because of an equal battle between positive and 
negative forces. Likewise, a President may be neutral because of an overall lack of 
concern for the subject, or because internal tensions, like Reagan and Bush experienced, 
lead him or her to take a hands-off approach.  
The next major national security issue may not be organizationally oriented and 
may instead be a major international security treaty or the use of military force. 
Regardless of the type of action taken, Congress’s speed of action will affect the 
outcome. Based upon this study’s findings, policy makers inside or outside of Capitol 
Hill looking for fast action should avoid setting up conflict. Instead they should attempt 
to capitalize on neutral and positive variables to achieve greater cooperation with 
Congress.  
E. FINAL SUMMARY 
Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 29, referred to “that body which is 
constituted the guardian of national security” immediately following his defense of the 
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power of Congress over the militia.224 Though he was most likely conferring the title 
upon the federal government as a whole, it is Congress’s powers that he explicitly 
mentions. He and the other Framers of the Constitution regarded Congress as a crucial 
arm of this guardian. Congress, far from rejecting this duty, has demonstrated time and 
again its interest and influence over the national security of the United States. 
Understanding this interest and influence requires examining Congress’s speed of action 
on national security matters. An effective method for analyzing this speed of action is 
observing the effects of five variables: constituent concern, interest groups, committees, 
party leadership and presidential leadership.  
Specifically, this thesis reviewed Congress’s speed on the Goldwater-Nichols 
defense reorganization of 1986 and the intelligence reform of 2004, finding in both cases 
that a combination of positive and neutral variables led to increased speed by Congress 
and fast major reforms of the respective national security agencies. Additionally, political 
and security crisis environments were shown to affect the five variables, which in turn 
affect Congress’s speed. Underlying tensions in national security policy, in these cases 
organizational problems, have led to a mistaken perception of Congress as apathetic. 
Congress, however, reacted quite quickly to proven evidence of such problems, usually 
encapsulated in trigger events. The historical background of defense and intelligence 
reform also indicated a pattern of Congress giving the executive branch time to 
implement change after major legislative national security agency reforms. 
In conclusion, Congress will continue to play a vital role in the national security 
policy arena. Policy makers and legislators who carefully examine the influences on 
Congress’s speed will have an advantage over those who simply view Congress as an 
obstacle to overcome. They will be able to identify the variables that may be slowing 
Congress down, direct their efforts accordingly, and achieve their goals through 
calculated cooperation with the first branch of the United States government. 
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